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This Article examines the states’ response to Epic Systems v. Lewis,
which held enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)
mandatory arbitration agreements that require employees to waive their
participation in collective and class actions in employment contracts.
Recent evidence shows that mandatory arbitration can erode access to
justice for and deterrence of employment law claims. States in response
are considering qui tam statutes, which assign the state interests in
penalties for employment law violations to private enforcers in return
for a bounty, to substitute for the loss of class action enforcement after
Epic Systems.
These statutes can increase deterrence and access to justice, and do not
implicate the FAA so long as the claim belongs to the state. But the
Supreme Court’s FAA jurisprudence evinces a hostility to statutes that
permit an end run around class action waivers. It is an open question at
what point a qui tam statute requires waiver under the FAA for
insufficiently distinguishing between the private and public interests in
enforcement. Current due process protections do not sufficiently protect
against this threat, or the interests of states and the affected employees.
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This Article offers the safeguard of agency oversight, often required by
state nondelegation doctrine, to protect state qui tam statutes from FAA
preemption by constraining qui tam claims to those that serve a distinct,
public interest. Meaningful public agency oversight over the resolution
of qui tam claims would protect the interests of the states and enable
agencies to protect the interests of aggrieved employees. States can also
reduce incentives for misuse of qui tam enforcement that harms the
interests of aggrieved employees by extending qui tam enforcement to
nonprofit public interest corporations as representative organizations.
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court has recently explored two provisions commonly
paired together in contracts between entities and their employees or
customers in Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) cases. The first—the
mandatory arbitration clause—purports to require their employee or
customer to pursue all future claims in arbitration rather than in fed-
eral or state court. The second —the class waiver—purports to waive
the employee’s or customer’s right to pursue her future claims against
the firm as part of a class, requiring her to proceed in individual arbi-
trations with any disputes. In Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, the most
recent foray into this area, the Court held these provisions enforcea-
ble for wage-and-hour law claims.1 Recent empirical evidence sug-
gests that foreclosing aggregate litigation of these claims has a
detrimental impact on deterrence and access to justice.2
In response, modeled on a current California law, seven states—
Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New York, Oregon, Vermont, and
Washington—have contemplated qui tam statutes to provide employ-
ees and representative organizations with standing to sue on behalf of
the state for penalties associated with employment law violations, in
return for a portion of the award.3 In this Article, I assess whether the
state qui tam action might be a viable substitute for the kinds of law-
suits covered by waivers like the one in Epic Systems. Qui tam statutes
such as the state false claims acts and California Private Attorney
General Act (PAGA) can be effective deterrents.4 They have survived
significant constitutional and FAA challenges because of the long qui
1. 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1632 (2018).
2. See infra Part II.B and notes 104–161.
3. H.B. 5381, 2020 Gen. Assemb., Feb. Sess. (Conn. 2020); S.B. 1066, 191st Gen. Assemb.
(Mass. 2019); S.P. 558, 129th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Me. 2019); Assemb. B. A2265, 2019 Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019); S.B. 750, 80th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2019); S.B. 139,
2019 Leg. (Vt. 2019); H.B. 1965, 66th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2019).
4. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 2698 et seq.
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tam tradition in the United States and the judiciary’s tolerance of pri-
vate delegation in economic and social regulation. There are also
strong federalism interests upheld in permitting states to preserve
their historic role of protecting vulnerable workers. Qui tam enforce-
ment, then, appears to be on solid constitutional ground.5
Epic Systems, however, presents a new threat that the FAA
preempts state qui tam statutes that seek to deter employment law
violations as an end run around class waivers. State qui tam statutes
permit aggrieved parties to seek penalties for conduct that also harms
the litigant without significant agency oversight. Additionally, they
can place considerable pressure on the distinction between public and
private interests. A ruling that a state may not assign an interest in
penalties for violation of substantive laws protecting victims may
destabilize the holding of Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion v. Waffle House Inc.,6 which permits public agencies to seek vic-
tim-specific relief notwithstanding a mandatory arbitration agreement.
State qui tam experimentation with insufficient agency oversight
can also create incentives for private enforcers to use the qui tam ve-
hicle in ways that do not clearly advance the public interest. Despite
criticism by employers that qui tam statutes risk over-enforcement,7
this Article argues that under-enforcement is the greater threat. Qui
tam legislation can address the risk of over-enforcement by exempting
harmless violations from its scope, and there is little evidence that the
private qui tam bar abuses qui tam statutes with frivolous claims. The
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Excessive
Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment, recently incorporated to the
states in Timbs v. Indiana,8 moreover, offer strong constitutional
guardrails protecting against the risk of over-enforcement.
Binding states and affected employees to the private enforcer’s res-
olution of a qui tam claim, however, can create perverse incentives to
under-enforce that are more difficult to resolve. Regulated entities,
specifically, may seek to collude with the weakest private enforcers in
substandard settlements that preclude more aggressive enforcement.9
Current due process protections for defendants in qui tam actions do
5. See infra Part III.A and notes 147–204.
6. 534 U.S. 279 (2002).
7. See, e.g., Chris Micheli, Private Attorneys General Act Lawsuits in California: A Review of
PAGA and Proposals for Reforming the “Sue Your Boss” Law, 49 U. PAC. L. REV. 265, 278–79
(2018).
8. 139 S. Ct. 682 (2019).
9. Qui tam claims bind government agencies and subsequent relators in order to safeguard the
due process rights of defendants. See infra note 239. Aggrieved parties, of course, are not barred
from vindicating their own rights in individual arbitrations.
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not protect against this threat. They only consider whether penalties
should be lowered, not raised, and do not enable courts to discern
whether the private enforcement advances a distinct, public interest.
This Article offers safeguards for state agency intervention as a con-
ceptual framework to address the FAA preemption threat to qui tam
enforcement and to better align private enforcement and public
agency interests in qui tam enforcement. Many of these safeguards are
already in place in the laws proposed in other states and may be easily
incorporated in PAGA. Most important is the right by state agencies
to intervene in qui tam claims in cases of private enforcer misuse.10 I
argue that state agency safeguards reduce the risk of FAA preemption
by providing agency oversight to ensure that qui tam enforcement
serves a distinct public interest. In some cases, state agency supervi-
sion is constitutionally required, while in others it may be established
through legislation or by administrative design.
The possibility of state agency intervention may improve deterrence
by encouraging enforcement of employment laws; however, a stronger
state agency role may only improve access to justice if the aggrieved
employees have voice in the resolution of the qui tam claim. But qui
tam statutes must be cautious in extending class action procedures for
resolving claims that provide portions of a bounty to aggrieved par-
ties. Extending full due process rights to these nonparties by statute
may convert qui tam into class claims, requiring FAA enforcement of
class waivers. State agency intervention in qui tam enforcement may
improve affected worker due process, by mimicking class action settle-
ment procedures in internal agency distribution of claims resolution
funds. Assigning qui tam enforcement to nonprofit public interest or-
ganizations may also encourage aggrieved employee participation in
private enforcer resolution of qui tam claims and can reduce the risk
of private enforcer misuse caused by the profit motive.11
Although this analysis has important implications for other under-
enforced areas of law, especially consumer protection, housing and
employment discrimination laws, and safety-and-health standards,12
10. See infra Part IV.A. and notes 239–275.
11. Channeling enforcement to non-profit organizations may also create incentives for misuse
that may require conditions on the delegation. See infra Part IV.B.2.
12. The most direct implications are for employment and housing discrimination and con-
sumer protection laws, where mandatory arbitration agreements with class waivers also distort
private enforcement. Connecticut and Washington have proposed qui tam statutes to enforce
their state employment discrimination laws. H.B. 5381, 2020 Gen. Assemb., Feb. Sess. (Conn.
2020); H.B. 1965, 66th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2019). Vermont recently proposed a qui tam
statute for consumer protection claims. See Vermont Model State Consumer Justice Enforce-
ment Act, S.B. 18, No. 74 (Vt. 2019). State qui tam enforcement also has implications for safety
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this Article focuses on wage-and-hour law for several reasons. There
is a well-documented trend of under-enforcement of wage-and-hour
laws that are often subject to mandatory arbitration agreements with
class waivers.13 The cases consolidated in Epic Systems illustrate this
trend: The putative class members alleged that their employers mis-
classified employees and required unpaid off-the-books work in viola-
tion of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).14 These claims are often
inefficient to bring individually in arbitration. Many individual FLSA
claims are of low value, or are difficult to prove, and unlikely to gar-
ner the interest of attorneys willing to represent them in individual
arbitration.15 While these claims are often brought on a collective or
class basis, employment contracts with mandatory arbitration and
class waiver provisions are becoming increasingly common.16
Current public and private enforcement cannot realistically substi-
tute the lost enforcement from the decline in class and collective ac-
tions after Epic Systems. Public agency enforcement of employment
law is a small fraction of total enforcement,17 and unions, which have
historically served as an internal safeguard to protect the fairness of
and health standards enforced by the state, as there is no private right of action to enforce the
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA), 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(4) (2012), and OSHA
has chronically insufficient public enforcement resources. Devah Pager, Bruce Western & David
Pedulla, Employment Discrimination and the Changing Landscape of Low-Wage Labor Markets,
2009 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 317, 325–26 (OSHA staffing and annual federal and state OSHA inspec-
tions declined by half between 1980 and 2006.). California extends its qui tam statute to state
safety-and-health violations, and Washington has contemplated a similar measure. See CAL.
LAB. CODE § 2699.3(b); H.B. 1965, 66th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2019). In contrast, the qui tam
vehicle has little applicability outside of public law. While the state has a parens patriae interest
in protecting “the health and well-being-both physical and economic-of its residents in general,”
Snapp v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982), a representational interest untethered to a sover-
eign or pecuniary harm appears to be the type of device to disfavor individual arbitration that
the majority in Epic Systems cautioned against. See Janet Cooper Alexander, To Skin A Cat: Qui
Tam Actions As A State Legislative Response to Concepcion, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1203,
1235 (2013) [hereinafter Alexander, To Skin A Cat] (proposing that California sufficiently distin-
guish its qui tam statute from “a private attorney general action in which the private plaintiff
stands in the shoes of the state as parens patriae representing a group,” in order to avoid FAA
preemption).
13. See infra Parts I, II.B.
14. In the cases consolidated in Epic Systems, employees alleged that the employer misclassi-
fied them as exempt from the Fair Labor Standards Act to avoid paying overtime premiums, in
violation of 29 U.S.C. § 207 (2012). See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1620 (2018).
15. See infra Part II.B.2 and accompanying notes 139–143.
16. See infra Part I and accompanying notes 38–42.
17. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-09-458T, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR: WAGE
AND HOUR DIVISION’S COMPLAINT INTAKE AND INVESTIGATIVE PROCESSES LEAVE LOW WAGE
WORKERS VULNERABLE TO WAGE THEFT 9 (2009) (Public enforcement of employment laws has
been far outpaced by the growth of employers.); ANDREW ELMORE & MUZAFFAR CHISHTI,
STRATEGIC LEVERAGE: USE OF STATE AND LOCAL LAWS TO ENFORCE LABOR STANDARDS IN
IMMIGRANT-DENSE OCCUPATIONS 17 n.64, 87 (Migration Policy Inst. 2018) (Most states have
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employee arbitrations, are absent from sectors where noncompliance
rates are highest.18
There is a longstanding and unresolved debate about whether an
arbitral forum can be an effective forum for some types of claims.19
But there is little doubt that in cases of misclassification, off-the-books
work, and minimum wage violations, the violations are often too sub-
tle and damages too low to efficiently adjudicate them in individual
arbitration.20 Assuming the wide adoption of mandatory arbitration
with class waivers in employment contracts after Epic Systems, private
enforcers will be unable to aggregate these claims. Recent empirical
evidence suggests that many such claims are unlikely to be asserted at
all.21
Deterring employment law violations and improving access to jus-
tice to assert employment law claims through state qui tam statutes is
an under-discussed and timely topic after Epic Systems. Most Federal
Arbitration Act scholarship critiques its expansion for ignoring its leg-
islative intent and purpose22 and its impact on private litigant access to
fewer than ten investigators to enforce a wide range of workplace laws, and five states do not
engage in any labor or safety and health regulation at all.).
18. Alison D. Morantz, What Unions Do for Regulation, 13 ANN. REV. LAW & SOC. SCI. 515,
523 (2017) (finding more frequent and intensive inspection of unionized establishments com-
pared with non-union establishments); DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE: WHY WORK
BECAME SO BAD FOR SO MANY AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO IMPROVE IT 41, 245–46, 254
(2014) (Union density has fallen from about thirty-five percent of the private-sector workforce in
1954 to its current level of 6.6%, and is virtually absent in under-regulated sectors of the econ-
omy, such as commercial cleaning and restaurants.).
19. Compare Alexander Colvin, An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration: Case Out-
comes and Processes, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEG. STU. 1, 30 (2011), with NDP ANALYTICS, FAIRER,
FASTER, BETTER: AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT OF EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION 4–5, 15 (May
2019) [hereinafter NDP ANALYTICS].
20. See infra Part II.B.2.
21. Cynthia Estlund, The Black Hole of Mandatory Arbitration, 96 N.C. L. REV. 679, 696–97
(2018) (comparing claims in workplaces that do and do not require mandatory arbitration with
class waivers, and estimating that mandatory arbitration agreements reduce employee claims by
over ninety-nine percent).
22. As Christopher Leslie demonstrates, Congress enacted the FAA to require “arbitration of
contract disputes between merchants, [and] . . . was not intended for complex legal issues, such
as those involving statutory claims.” Christopher R. Leslie, The Arbitration Bootstrap, 94 TEX. L.
REV. 265, 305–12 (2015). As such, Congress did not intend the FAA to apply to consumer con-
tracts, and moreover, in enacting the FAA before the New Deal federalization of workplace
regulation, “did not consider itself to have the authority to legislate as to the arbitrability of the
worker’s employment contract.” Id.; see also Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Rustic Justice: Com-
munity and Coercion Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 77 N.C. L. REV. 931, 973–96 (1999)
(describing pre-FAA rise of arbitration among merchants, and common law rules enforcing self-
regulation by trade associations, such as bankers and stock exchanges, “in order to support a
system of self-regulation”).
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the courthouse.23 Few scholars who have focused on qui tam statutes24
have addressed the threat of FAA preemption.25 Examination of state
versions of qui tam enforcement reveals their relative strength against
FAA challenges, but that they can closely resemble class claims, giving
rise to a need for law to constrain their use. While other scholars have
23. See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, Widening the Lens: Refocusing The Litigation Cost-and-Delay
Narrative, 40 CARDOZO L. REV. 57, 87 (2018) (“It is claimed that efficiency gains will result from
[mandatory arbitration’s flight] from the courthouse and should be celebrated. But, again, why
aren’t the unquantifiable deleterious effects on due process protections, jury trial rights, and
citizen access more important than a reduction in court filings?”); Judith Resnik, Fairness in
Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125
HARV. L. REV. 78, 88 (2011) (Open access to courts levels distinctions between individuals and
entities, and imparts “the dignity reflected in the status held by a juridical person, competent to
sue or be sued, able to prompt an answer from and entitled to be treated on a par with one’s
adversary—whether that be an individual, a corporation, or the government itself.”).
24. Janet Cooper Alexander, Pamela Bucy and Myriam Gilles have written extensively about
qui tam enforcement as an alternative to purely private enforcement. See, e.g., Myriam Gilles,
The Politics of Access: Examining Concerted State/Private Enforcement Solution to Class Action
Bans, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 2223, 2224 (2018); Alexander, To Skin A Cat, supra note 12, at 1203;
Pamela Bucy, Private Justice and The Constitution, 69 TENN. L. REV. 939, 950–78 (2002) [herein-
after Bucy, Private Justice and the Constitution]. Qui tam scholarship primarily evaluates the
federal False Claims Act, which provides for a greater level of agency oversight than state qui
tam experimentation. See Myriam E. Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform Litigation: Deputiz-
ing Private Citizens in the Enforcement of Civil Rights, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1384, 1424 (2000)
(“The current qui tam provisions [of the False Claims Act] . . . have thus proven the most effec-
tive means of recapturing the estimated billions of dollars of public money lost to fraudulent
practices each year.”); Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 53 (2002) [hereinaf-
ter Bucy, Private Justice] (arguing that compared with private enforcement of securities and
environmental law, the False Claims Act is “extraordinarily successful as a regulatory tool”).
Janet Cooper Alexander argues that the California Private Attorney General Act (PAGA) can
address under-enforcement of consumer protection and employment laws but does not address
the risk of FAA preemption because of loose agency oversight. See Alexander, To Skin A Cat,
supra note 12.
25. Myriam Gilles and Gary Friedman have engaged in the most recent, sustained analysis of
FAA preemption of state qui tam enforcement. They argue that states have an insufficient inter-
est in enforcing employment laws to confer standing on claimants in state qui tam claims and
propose as an alternative an agency model of qui tam enforcement in which public agencies
deputize private enforcers as agents of the state. Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, The New Qui
Tam: A Model for The Enforcement of Group Rights in a Hostile Era, 98 TEX. L. REV. 489
(2020) [hereinafter Gilles & Friedman, The New Qui Tam]. This Article argues that, assuming
sufficient public agency oversight, qui tam statutes are currently safe from constitutional and
FAA challenge. See infra Part III.A and notes 147–204. But should the Supreme Court adopt a
less formalist interpretation of the FAA, and examine the de facto interests advanced by qui tam
statutes, and in strong nondelegation states that constitutionally require the agency oversight
that Professor Gilles and Mr. Friedman propose, an agency relationship is an important alterna-
tive model. An agency model must, however, overcome the public agency risk that deputizing
politically unaccountable private enforcers will cause electoral backlash, or distort public en-
forcement aims, and the private enforcer risk that public agencies will abuse their oversight role
by derailing meritorious cases. In light of these risks, extending state qui tam statutes is prefera-
ble to deputization so long as the doctrinal and normative risks can be managed. Zachary
Clopton also recently discusses the possibility of FAA preemption of PAGA. See Zachary D.
Clopton, Procedural Retrenchment and the States, 106 CAL. L. REV. 411, 455 (2018).
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discussed constitutional limitations as potential threats to qui tam en-
forcement,26 this Article offers state agency oversight, which is often
constitutionally required by states, as a safeguard to preserve qui tam
statutes from FAA preemption.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I describes the under-en-
forcement of wage-and-hour law as driven by the historic lack of legal
remedies and access to justice and the new threat of mandatory arbi-
tration and class waivers. This Part introduces the two leading types of
qui tam statues—whistleblower claims by informers, such as federal
and state false claims acts (FCAs), and aggrieved party claims by vic-
tims, exemplified by PAGA. Part II turns to the recent Supreme Court
expansion of the FAA and its erosion of deterrence and access to jus-
tice by removing access to collective and class litigation, particularly
for low-value, complex claims. Part III evaluates the recent state inter-
est in qui tam statutes as a substitute for the collective and class em-
ployment law claims lost after Epic Systems. It finds that while qui tam
enforcement can improve deterrence of employment law violations
and access to justice, it creates a doctrinal risk of FAA preemption
because of the Supreme Court’s hostility to statutes that can create an
end run around class waivers. This Part concludes that addressing this
risk, and the risk of private enforcer misuse, will require constraining
their use beyond current due process protections. Part IV proposes
the requirement of agency oversight as a conceptual framework to do
this. While preserving the qui tam vehicle from FAA preemption,
however, agency oversight alone cannot adequately protect the inter-
ests of the affected employees. To address this due process concern,
this Part proposes that state agencies encourage aggrieved party par-
ticipation in the resolution of qui tam claims. The legislature may, ad-
ditionally, assign qui tam enforcement to nonprofit public interest
organizations that are internally accountable to the affected employ-
ees. The Article concludes that state qui tam statutes can substitute
for the lost deterrence of employment law violations after Epic Sys-
tems and partially substitute for the access to justice lost after the de-
cline of employment class claims.
I. THE UNDER-ENFORCEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW
AFTER EPIC SYSTEMS
Many employment laws are under-enforced in the United States,
particularly in the low-wage workplace. Studies have consistently
26. See, e.g., Bucy, Private Justice and the Constitution, supra note 24, at 950–78; Richard A.
Bales, A Constitutional Defense of Qui Tam, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 381, 384 (2001).
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found that between ten percent and twenty percent of low-wage em-
ployees are paid below the minimum wage in the previous month.27 In
New York City, Chicago, and Los Angeles alone, wage-and-hour law
violations result in $3 billion in annual underpayments to low-wage
workers.28 Employment law violations are particularly likely in under-
regulated sectors of the economy. Up to one-third of construction and
transportation employees are misclassified as independent contrac-
tors.29 Nearly one-half of garment workers report receiving less than
their owed minimum wages, and eighty-eight percent of home health
workers report illegal, unpaid off-the-books work.30
Scholars attribute these low compliance levels to the under-enforce-
ment of employment laws in the low-wage workplace.31 Claims for
owed wages, the primary focus of this Article, are often low-value
claims that do not justify the hassle and expense of an individual law-
suit in light of the rational fear of employer retaliation.32
Employers in low-wage industries often seek to remain competitive
through systematic noncompliance with employment law,33 even shift-
ing employees off payroll entirely, avoiding not only potential liability
from a FLSA claim but also unpaid workers compensation premiums,
payroll taxes, and unemployment insurance contributions.34 Misclas-
sification of employees as independent contractors can be difficult to
identify, and litigation typically requires application of an unstruc-
tured, multi-factor test that is difficult and expensive to litigate, with
27. E. RESEARCH GRP., THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF WAGE VIOLATIONS: ESTI-
MATES FOR CALIFORNIA AND NEW YORK 2–3, 26 (2014), https://www.dol.gov/asp/evaluation/
completed-studies/wageviolationsreportdecember2014.pdf.
28. ANNETTE BERNHARDT ET AL., BROKEN LAWS, UNPROTECTED WORKERS: VIOLATIONS OF
EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAWS IN AMERICA’S CITIES (2009) [hereinafter BERNHARDT ET AL.,
BROKEN LAWS, UNPROTECTED WORKERS].
29. ELMORE & CHISHTI, supra note 17, at 10 nn.24–25.
30. BERNHARDT ET AL., BROKEN LAWS, UNPROTECTED WORKERS, supra note 28.
31. See generally WEIL, supra note 18, at 54, 70–73, 245.
32. SHANNON GLEESON, PRECARIOUS CLAIMS: THE PROMISE AND FAILURE OF WORKPLACE
PROTECTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 118–22 (2015) (finding that “the administrative procedure
of rights enforcement is not cost-neutral and can lead to unintended consequences that com-
pound the harms of the original injury . . . [including] time and opportunity costs, the ability to
reenter the labor market, and the impact on family and social networks”). Workers who lack
authorization to work under immigration law may additionally fear that a complaint to a public
agency will lead to arrest and deportation. See ELMORE & CHISHTI, supra note 17; Christina
Goldbaum, Trump Crackdown Unnerves Immigrants, and the Farmers Who Rely on Them, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 18, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/18/nyregion/ny-farmers-undocu
mented-workers-trump-immigration.html.
33. Noah Zatz, Working Beyond the Reach or Grasp of Employment Law, in THE GLOVES-
OFF ECONOMY 47 (2006).
34. Employers in dangerous industries such as construction and transportation can save be-
tween thirty percent to fifty percent of labor costs by misclassifying employees as independent
contractors. ELMORE & CHISHTI, supra note 17, at 12.
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an uncertain outcome.35 As Elizabeth Tippett explains, employers can
also use timekeeping software to round down, automatically deduct,
or otherwise shave small increments of time from work days without
employees noticing.36
Employment laws encourage private enforcement of low-value,
complex claims with the availability of collective or class action vehi-
cles to aggregate claims and spread litigation costs.37 About forty per-
cent of FLSA claims are filed as collective actions.38 But mandatory
arbitration provisions, while only applying to two percent of work-
places in the mid-1990s, now cover over half of private-sector, non-
union employees.39 While arbitrations can theoretically adjudicate
class claims, the Supreme Court recently held in Lamps Plus v.
Varela40 that the FAA envisions “an individualized form of arbitra-
tion,” and requires individual arbitration unless the parties expressly
agree to class adjudication.41
In response to the fall of the class action after Epic Systems, states
have sought to improve employment law compliance through qui tam
statutes. The classic qui tam statute is the federal False Claims Act,
replicated in some form by most states. In 2004, California amended
its labor code to provide a Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA), a
qui tam statute specifically for victims of employment law violations.42
Seven states (Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New York, Oregon,
Vermont, and Washington) have contemplated versions of this statute.
The remainder of this Part will describe these two leading types of qui
tam statutes for whistleblowers and for aggrieved parties.
35. See Andrew Elmore, Collaborative Enforcement, 10 NE. U.L. REV. 72, 86–93 (2018).
36. Elizabeth Tippett, How Employers Profit from Digital Wage Theft Under the FLSA, 55
AM. BUS. L.J. 315 (2018).
37. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2012); see also Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617
(1997) (Class actions “overcome the problem that small recoveries do not provide incentive for
any individual to bring a solo action . . . by aggregating the relatively paltry potential recoveries
into” a worthwhile claim.); Zachary D. Clopton, Class Actions and Executive Power, 92 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 878, 879 (2017) (“[S]ince 1966, federal and state legislatures have routinely relied on
private enforcement to further societal goals such as deterrence and compensation.”).
38. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-14-69, FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT: THE DE-
PARTMENT OF LABOR SHOULD DEVELOP A MORE SYSTEMATIC APPROACH TO DEVELOPING ITS
GUIDANCE 16 (2013).
39. Alexander J.S. Colvin & Kelly Pike, Saturns and Rickshaws Revisited: What Kind of Arbi-
tration System has Developed?, 29 OH. STATE. J. ON DISP. RES. 59 (2014); Estlund, supra note 21,
at 689.
40. 139 S. Ct. 1407 (2019).
41. Id. at 1416. No estimate is available of the proportion of mandatory arbitration agree-
ments that expressly permit class adjudication. But since most employers expressly require
mandatory arbitration agreements that waive participation in class and collective claims, it seems
unlikely that many do.
42. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 2698 et seq.
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A. State Qui Tam Claims to Deter Violations of Employment Law
This Section introduces state qui tam enforcement to encourage the
identification and litigation of employment claims. It will define qui
tam statutes and their use by whistleblowers and aggrieved parties,
and conclude that both can be effective in their primary goal of in-
creasing deterrence.
In a qui tam action, the state partially assigns its interests to a pri-
vate individual, often called a relator, who civilly litigates the claim on
behalf of the state, in return for a bounty or a portion of the collected
award. A qui tam statute is unlike other forms of private litigation in
that a relator seeks to vindicate a claim on behalf of the state, rather
than on her own behalf.
Qui tam has an ancient pedigree;43 as the Supreme Court in Ver-
mont Agency of Natural Resources v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens explains, the
qui tam statutes:
[h]istorically “were of two types: those that allowed injured parties
to sue in vindication of their own interests (as well as the Crown’s)
. . . and . . . those that allowed informers to obtain a portion of the
penalty as a bounty for their information, even if they had not suf-
fered an injury themselves . . . .”44
These two types of qui tam claims—by whistleblowers and by ag-
grieved parties45—find modern examples among the states. State
whistleblower statutes, modeled on the federal False Claims Act, as-
sign the states’ interest in fraud on the states to whistleblowers and
exist in most states.46 Only California has adopted an aggrieved party
qui tam claim, the Private Attorney General Act (PAGA), which de-
ters public law violations that harm individuals by assigning to those
individuals the state’s interest in penalties for the public law
violations.
This Section next explores the structure and administrative designs
of whistleblower and aggrieved party qui tam statutes.
43. Qui tam originated under English common law in the thirteenth century and means he
“who pursues this action on our Lord the King’s behalf as well as his own.” Vt. Agency of Nat.
Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 768, n.1 (2000).
44. Id. at 776. The relator in Vermont Agency of Natural Resources was an employee who
alleged that his former employer submitted false claims to the Environmental Protection Agency
that fraudulently overstated the employer’s time spent on federally funded projects. Id.
45. This Article uses the terms “aggrieved party” and “whistleblower” as cognates for the
jurisdictional bars in PAGA and the FCA, respectively, and in that sense the two terms are
mutually exclusive. Certainly, an aggrieved party can also be a whistleblower to the extent that
the aggrieved party brings forward unique information about a harm to the state and/or other
individuals who also harm her.
46. 29 states and the District of Columbia have enacted state false claims acts. Gilles & Fried-
man, The New Qui Tam, supra note 25, at 492.
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1. Whistleblower Qui Tam Statute
Whistleblower qui tam statutes are intended to encourage individu-
als with inside knowledge about fraud on the state to come forward as
informants. The quintessential whistleblower qui tam statute is the
False Claims Act (FCA),47 which Congress enacted in 1863, over a
half century before the FAA. While originally an obscure statute, the
1986 amendments to the qui tam provision of the FCA, guaranteeing
successful qui tam relators a minimum share in the recovery and re-
laxing its proof requirement and fraud standard, elevated its profile
and use.48
Under the federal FCA’s qui tam provision, a bona fide
whistleblower, called a relator, may assert claims of fraud on behalf of
the federal government.49 To avoid redundant and fraudulent qui tam
filings, relators must be an “original source” of the information about
the fraudulent practice and must file a specialized complaint in federal
court alleging the FCA violation, which is filed under seal. The action
is stayed while qui tam counsel delivers a copy of the complaint to the
Department of Justice (DOJ) notifying DOJ about the lawsuit. DOJ
then determines whether or not to intervene and assume primary re-
sponsibility for the case. Even if DOJ does intervene, the relator may
remain a party and retains substantial input in the conduct of the case.
While DOJ may intervene to dismiss the claim, it must provide the
relator with notice and an opportunity for a hearing on the motion. If
DOJ declines to intervene, the relator may proceed independently
and litigate the case on behalf of the government.50 While in either
event, a successful case entitles the relators to a bounty,51 FCA claims
are far more likely to prevail with DOJ intervention.52
The FCA is an effective vehicle to harness private litigation to iden-
tify and litigate fraud against the state. The DOJ reports that in fiscal
year 2017 $3.4 billion of the $3.7 billion in settlements and judgments
reported from civil cases involving fraud and false claims against the
47. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(b)(1) (West 2017).
48. See False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, 31 U.S.C.A. §§ 3729-3731 (West 2017); see
Bucy, Private Justice, supra note 24, at 54 (reporting an average of 237.5 qui tam FCA cases filed
annually after 1986, far greater than the 181.8 securities fraud and 34.7 environmental citizens
suits filed annually during the same period). While DOJ reports having received six qui tam
cases per year until 1986, from 1986 to 2000, “3326 qui tam cases have been filed and $4.024
billion has been recovered.” Id. at 48.
49. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(a).
50. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730.
51. 31 U.S.C.A. §§ 3729(a), 3730(b)(2)-(4) (A relator who is an original source is guaranteed a
minimum award of fifteen percent of the judgment or settlement if DOJ intervenes, and twenty-
five percent if DOJ does not intervene.).
52. Bucy, Private Justice, supra note 24, at 51.
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government were filed by whistleblowers as relators under the FCA
qui tam provisions.53 The “dual-plaintiff” structure of the FCA pro-
vides an efficient way for private litigants to supplement DOJ re-
sources and reserves for DOJ a substantial gatekeeping role for
private qui tam litigation.54 It also encourages a highly competent pri-
vate bar to litigate qui tam cases.55 Since relators are most likely to
prevail with DOJ intervention, the FCA rewards specialized counsel
who can persuade DOJ of the merits of the FCA claim.56
State FCAs adopt a similar administrative design and are often en-
forced by state attorneys general.57 State FCAs have broad variation
and have encouraged employment law claims by aggrieved parties
that also allege fraud on the state. New York, for example, lowered
the threshold value of state FCA relator claims and expanded their
scope to include employment-related tax fraud,58 leading labor unions
in the construction industry to file qui tam claims against employers in
prevailing wage projects that misclassify or underpay employees.59
53. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRESS RELEASE: JUSTICE DEPARTMENT RECOVERS OVER $3.7 BILLION
FROM FALSE CLAIMS ACT CASES IN FISCAL YEAR 2017 (Dec. 21, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/
opa/pr/justice-department-recovers-over-37-billion-false-claims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2017.
Pamela Bucy attributes this to the jurisdictional bar limiting relators to original sources, which
filters out frivolous and redundant claims, while the large bounty offered to successful
whistleblowers encourages true insiders who may otherwise remain silent to come forward.
Bucy, Private Justice, supra note 24, at 53–54. In the past two years, this proportion of qui tam to
total recovery seems to have dropped, in fiscal year 2019 to $2.1 billion of the $3 billion total.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRESS RELEASE: JUSTICE DEPARTMENT RECOVERS OVER $3 BILLION FROM
FALSE CLAIMS ACT CASES IN FISCAL YEAR 2019 (Jan. 9, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
justice-department-recovers-over-3-billion-false-claims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2019.
54. Bucy, Private Justice, supra note 24, at 52–53.
55. An empirical survey of 4,000 qui tam claims by David Engstrom found that specialized qui
tam attorneys “enjoy[ ] higher litigation success rates and surfac[e] larger frauds compared to
less experienced firms.” David Freeman Engstrom, Harnessing the Private Attorney General: Ev-
idence from Qui Tam Litigation, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1244, 1249 (2012).
56. Bucy, Private Justice, supra note 24, at 58.
57. See, e.g., N.Y. FIN. LAW. §§ 187 et seq. (McKinney 2018) (adopting same filing and inter-
vention requirements as the FCA, and vesting enforcement in the New York Attorney General).
58. See N.Y. FIN. LAW § 189.4(a).
59. Prevailing wage laws require employers to file certified payroll records with the state
showing payment of statutory wage rates and impose criminal and civil sanctions for underre-
porting workers and falsifying wages. See, e.g., Wall v. Circle C Constr., 2014 WL 4477367 (6th
Cir. 2012) (FCA claim for violation of federal prevailing wage law for failure to list employees in
certified payroll reports); Thompson Pac. Constr., Inc. v. City of Sunnyvale, 66 Cal. Rptr. 3d 175
(2007) (same under California FCA); New York v. Express Hosp. Grp., No. 100789/2015, Settle-
ment Agreement (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 7, 2017) (settling claim in which employer failed to report
employees in tax forms); see also PRESS RELEASE, A.G. SCHNEIDERMAN ANNOUNCES $255,000
SETTLEMENT WITH GENERAL CONTRACTOR AND DEVELOPER FOR FAILURE TO PAY WORKERS
REQUIRED PREVAILING WAGE, https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman-announces-
255000-settlement-general-contractor-and-developer-failure (Construction worker union, as re-
lator, filed qui tam claim with New York Attorney General, which resolved allegation that a
contractor underpaid twenty-eight workers in a state prevailing wage project.).
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2. Aggrieved Party Qui Tam Statute
The California Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA),60
creates state penalties for violations of the California Labor Code61
and “authorizes an employee to bring an action for civil penalties on
behalf of the state against his or her employer for Labor Code viola-
tions committed” in the previous year.62 Similar to the FCA, PAGA
provides a bounty of twenty-five percent of the collected penalties to
aggrieved employees and reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. But un-
like FCA, which limits the assignment to individuals with unique
knowledge of illegal conduct, PAGA limits the state assignment to
those employees of the defendant who were injured by the claimed
violation. Also unlike FCA, which constrains redundant claims with
significant oversight, PAGA calls for limited state agency authority to
intervene in or dismiss claims in order to incentivize private enforce-
ment.63 In 2016 California amended PAGA, funding the California
Labor and Development Workforce Agency (LWDA) staff to oversee
PAGA claims through a PAGA filing fee,64 although PAGA has no
mechanism for LWDA to intervene in PAGA litigation after the initial
period has elapsed.
In addition to its looser agency oversight, the California legislature
encourages private enforcement of PAGA by removing some of the
jurisdictional bars of the FCA whistleblower qui tam claim. There is
no minimum dollar threshold to exclude low-value claims as with the
FCA, and PAGA may be filed in a regular complaint alongside related
claims. The employment bar may draw from the same facts and form
as a standard employment complaint to allege a PAGA violation.
Prior to Epic Systems, many employment law class action claims in
60. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2698 et seq.
61. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699(e). The penalties range from $100-$500 per violation, which the
statute defines as any violation of the California Labor Code, per employee, per pay period. Id.
62. Sakkab v. Luxottica Retail N. Am., Inc., 803 F.3d 425, 429 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Is-
kanian v. CLS Transp. Los Angeles, LLC, 59 Cal. 4th 348, 360 (2014)).
63. Aggrieved employees must notify the California Labor and Development Workforce
Agency (LWDA) about the claim within ten days of filing it and the agency may intervene to
investigate the alleged violation within sixty-five days of notice. State issuance of a citation for
health and safety violations precludes aggrieved employee PAGA enforcement, as does timely
employer correction of some violations, such as incomplete wage statements, and PAGA ex-
cludes relatively minor violations, such as conspicuous posting of employee rights. If LWDA
does not intervene, the aggrieved employee must provide the agency with any post-filing pro-
posed settlement, which requires judicial approval. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699. Aggrieved employ-
ees must notify the state workforce agency via an internet portal. See CAL. DEP’T OF INDUS.
RELATIONS, PRIVATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL ACT (PAGA) – FILING (Jan. 2019), https://www.
dir.ca.gov/Private-Attorneys-General-Act/Private-Attorneys-General-Act.html.
64. S.B. 836, 2016 Leg. (Cal. 2016).
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California resolved PAGA claims for penalties alongside class claims
for damages related to the substantive law violation.
As with whistleblower claims, PAGA has been effective in encour-
aging aggrieved party enforcement of state penalties for violations of
state employment laws. Like FCA enforcement, PAGA is now a
greater proportion of enforcement of state penalties than inspections
by the public agency. A legislative report found an average of
4,000–7,000 PAGA notices per year in California, over twice the num-
ber of inspections conducted by the California Bureau of Field En-
forcement (BOFE).65 Private enforcer recovery of penalties via
PAGA has grown dramatically since 2012, from about $4.5 million to
over $41 million per year.66 BOFE collection of penalties from affirm-
ative inspections ranges between $8.4 and $11 million per year during
the same period.67
The whistleblower and aggrieved party qui tam claims have become
the subject of legislative interest by states after Epic Systems. The next
Part will explain why. It will first explore the expanding reach of the
FAA to include aggregate litigation of wage-and-hour law with Epic
Systems as driven by the Court’s elevation of liberty of contract as the
dominant due process interest protected by the FAA. It will then ex-
plain that mandatory arbitration with class waivers has undermined
deterrence and access to justice, especially for low-value and complex
employment law claims. Recent state interest in qui tam enforcement
seeks to substitute for the loss of deterrence of employment law viola-
tions after Epic Systems.
65. CAL. LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFF., LABOR CODE PRIVATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL ACT
RESOURCES 2 (Mar. 25, 2016). The California Bureau of Field Enforcement reported having
conducted 2,424 inspections in FY 2015-2016. CAL. DEP’T OF INDUS. RELATIONS, 2015–2016
FISCAL YEAR REPORT ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE BUREAU OF FIELD ENFORCEMENT 3
(2016) [hereinafter BOFE 2016 REPORT], https://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/BOFE_LegReport
2016.pdf.
66. Response by California Private Attorney General Act Custodial Official to Public
Records Act Request of Andrew Elmore (Mar. 6, 2020) (on file with author). This recent decline
in the employment class action may have accelerated this growth. California reports $63.7 mil-
lion in PAGA penalties collected in the six months from July 2019 to January 2020. Id.
67. BOFE 2016 REPORT, supra note 65, at 3. This is not to suggest that aggregate number of
claims and inspections, or penalties collected, are accurate measures of deterrence. As explained
in detail infra Part III.B., private enforcers have an economic incentive to seek out the wealthiest
targets with the greatest number of penalties to aggregate, while public agencies may be more
likely to seek out noncompliant, undercapitalized firms or more severe violations involving
smaller groups of employees. Public enforcement directed to particular low-compliance sectors
or egregious conduct may have a greater deterrent effect even if it yields a lower total number of
inspections and penalties collected. Making this assessment will require further research into the
particular sectors and employers that public and private enforcers target.
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II. THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT (FAA) AND THE IMPACT OF
EPIC SYSTEMS ON DETERRENCE OF EMPLOYMENT LAW
VIOLATIONS AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE
To those well-versed in the Supreme Court’s FAA jurisprudence,
the formal holding of Epic Systems—finding that the FAA requires
individual arbitration of class and collective FLSA claims notwith-
standing National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) protection of con-
certed activities by workers—treads familiar ground.68 This Part,
however, argues that Epic Systems is a new, potent threat to deter-
rence and access to justice for employees seeking to assert employ-
ment claims.
Even as the Court broadly interpreted the FAA in the 1990s to re-
quire enforcement of mandatory arbitration provisions, it did so with
the assumption that private arbitration can advance access to justice
and deterrence goals by providing a fast, inexpensive route to adjudi-
cate disputes.69 Due process retains vitality in this analysis to super-
vise arbitration agreements for unconscionable terms that undermine
substantive law.70
This Part argues that Epic Systems, while continuing a steady march
of cases that have expanded the reach of the FAA, represents a new
threat to the aggregation of employment law claims for two reasons.
First, it narrows the scope of NLRA protection of concerted activities
to skirt any potential conflict with the FAA. Second, it expressly cau-
tions against new devices that would permit the aggregation of em-
ployment claims despite a forced arbitration provision with class
waiver. This has important implications for state innovations, such as
qui tam statutes, which seek to use the partial assignment of state
68. See Sergio J. Campos, The Uncertain Path of Class Action Law, 40 CARDOZO L. REV.
2223, 2293–94 (2019) (explaining that the Epic Systems “majority opinion has a conservative
(small c) bent, appealing not to policy but to the constraints of precedent”).
69. So long as access to justice can be equally achieved in an arbitral forum, substantive law
“will continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent function.” Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plym-
outh, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 636 (1985)) (internal quotations omitted) (holding that FAA required
arbitration of ADEA despite collective action provision in statute because individual rights
could be efficiently met in arbitral forum); J. Maria Glover, Disappearing Claims and the Ero-
sion of Substantive Law, 124 YALE L.J. 3052, 3063 (2015).
70. See, e.g., Cole v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1468 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding that
due process prohibits conditioning employment on requiring employee to pay for an arbitrator’s
compensation in order to assert a Title VII claim); Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933,
940–41 (4th Cir. 1999) (striking down one-sided arbitration procedures on breach of contract
grounds because they were “a sham system unworthy even of the name of arbitration,” which
demonstrated an abuse of power); Alexander v. Anthony Int’l, L.P., 341 F.3d 256, 256, 272 (3d
Cir. 2003) (restricting remedies, forbidding attorneys fees and requiring losing party to pay arbi-
tration costs procedurally and substantively unconscionable).
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claims to private individuals to counteract the loss of deterrence of
and access to justice for employment law.
This Section will only briefly recite AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concep-
cio´n,71 American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant,72 and Epic
Systems Corp. v. Lewis,73 to summarize the Court’s elevation of the
parties’ interest in liberty of contract as the dominant concern in FAA
jurisprudence. It will then show how this liberty of contract turn has
eroded access to justice and deterrence of employment law violations.
A. The Liberty of Contract Turn of the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA)
The Supreme Court’s turn to liberty of contract in FAA jurispru-
dence begins with Concepcio´n, in which AT&T unilaterally required
customers to agree to arbitration and to waive participation in class
action litigation.74 Reversing the Ninth Circuit’s ruling that the class
waiver provision was unconscionable under California law, Concep-
cio´n found that the FAA preempts a state unconscionability doctrine
that prohibits class action waivers because this disfavors individual ar-
bitration. While minimizing the impact of class action waivers on de-
terrence and access to justice, the Court did not cast doubt on its
previous rulings that distinguished between “procedural rights,” which
can be waived in arbitration agreements, and “substantive rights,” in-
cluding essential, operative protections of a statute, which cannot.75
Taken on its face, then, Concepcio´n could be seen as a determination
that individual (or bilateral) arbitration is, at least in theory, in the
interests of both parties—preserving the possibility that FAA preemp-
tion might yield to procedural waivers that fundamentally alter sub-
stantive law.
Italian Colors, however, in narrowing the effective vindication doc-
trine, signaled a more radical shift, requiring waiver of procedural de-
vices notwithstanding its de facto erosion of substantive law. While
the $30 claim in Concepcio´n could still theoretically be brought in in-
dividual arbitration, Italian Colors presented a different sort of claim,
which the parties agreed could only be brought in the aggregate be-
71. 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
72. 570 U.S. 228 (2013).
73. 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018).
74. In Concepcio´n, the plaintiffs  sought to certify a class action alleging that AT&T’s offer of
a free phone with the price of the servicing agreement violated consumer protection law in fail-
ing to disclose the consumer’s required payment of $30 in sales tax on the phone. Concepcio´n,
563 U.S. at 337.
75. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 29 (1991) (quoting Mitsubishi Mo-
tors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)).
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cause of the projected $1 million in required expert fees.76 The Court
acknowledged that waiving a statutory right or imposing arbitration
fees “so high as to make access to the forum impracticable” is not
enforceable.77 But the allegation that arbitration “is not worth the ex-
pense involved in proving a statutory remedy”78 is insufficient to show
a waiver of a substantive right. While preserving the effective vindica-
tion doctrine for individual rights, it requires enforcement of class
waivers even if aggregation is the only effective means to vindicate the
claim. For J. Maria Glover, FAA preemption, thus, “had fully evolved
from one that had eroded the public realm to one that now also
eroded the substantive law.”79 According to Professor Glover, the
Court in overruling the effective vindication doctrine in Italian Colors
“subtly but definitely abandoned its descriptive and normative pre-
mise that freedom of contract was justified in the arbitration context
because it would result in more cost-effective procedures for ‘settling’
disputes and, accordingly, effective enforcement of the federal statu-
tory regime.”80
The Supreme Court in Epic Systems extended this interpretation by
resolving a tension between the FAA and NLRA decidedly in favor of
a liberty of contract version of due process in the workplace. While
Concepcio´n and Italian Colors would seem to make this outcome in-
evitable, employment law’s complicated relationship with mandatory
arbitration created some doubt. Employment contracts are rarely the
product of meaningful bargaining, and private-sector, non-union em-
ployers have an incentive to impose one-sided mandatory arbitration
provisions on employees. The Supreme Court acknowledged this real-
ity in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., holding that while the
FAA required enforcement of mandatory arbitration provisions for
age discrimination claims, safeguards would protect deterrence and
access to justice.81 The Court reasoned these interests would be pre-
served because the FAA’s savings clause expressly permits state con-
tract defenses, arbitration can accommodate class claims, and the
76. Am. Exp. Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 231 (2013).
77. Id. at 236. The Missouri Supreme Court found unenforceable a mandatory arbitration
clause that required the consumer to bear the costs of arbitration and permitted the lender to
seek attorney’s fees from the consumer on this ground. See Brewer v. Missouri Title Loans, 364
S.W.3d 486, 493 (Mo. 2012).
78. Italian Colors, 570 U.S. at 236.
79. Glover, supra note 69, at 3072.
80. Id. For Justice Elena Kagan, Italian Colors is not subtle at all: “The monopolist gets to use
its monopoly power to insist on a contract effectively depriving its victims of all legal recourse,”
to which the majority opinion replies: “Too darn bad.” Am. Exp. Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570
U.S. 228, 240 (2013) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
81. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
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government agency (the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion (EEOC)) can also seek class-wide and equitable relief.82 Employ-
ers began adopting mandatory arbitration provisions after Gilmer, but
it was an open question whether requiring employees to waive collec-
tive grievances conflicts with the NLRA’s protection of collective
process.83
The Supreme Court resolved this question in Epic Systems. Epic
Systems consolidated a number of cases in which the employer sought
to force arbitration of wage-and-hour law claims under the FLSA on
FAA grounds. The three consolidated, underlying claims brought by
employees in Epic Systems all alleged that the employer either mis-
classified them as exempt or kept work entirely off the books to avoid
paying required hourly wages under the FLSA.84 Like the Sherman
Act claim in Italian Colors, because of the FLSA proof requirements
and the small individual recovery, none of these cases could be
brought efficiently in bilateral arbitrations.
Rejecting the argument that the NLRA’s protection of concerted
activities prevents enforcement of class waivers, the Court found that
the FAA requires enforcement of waiver of FLSA collective actions.
In elevating liberty of contract in its FAA jurisprudence involving em-
ployment law claims, Epic Systems did not describe the particular ar-
bitration procedures put in place by the defendant employers. Nor did
it argue that bilateral arbitration is (even plausibly, as in Concepcio´n)
more effective and efficient than class action litigation. Rejecting the
dissent’s reference to the NLRA’s legislative history and the practical
82. Id. at 32–34.
83. After Concepcio´n, in 2012 the NLRB announced in the D.R. Horton rule that the NLRA
guarantees the right to redress workplace grievances collectively, “for mutual aid and protec-
tion.” 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012). See In re D.R. Horton, 375 N.L.R.B. 2277, 2278 (2012). The Board
relied, in part, on Supreme Court precedent stating that federal labor law “protects employees
from retaliation by their employer when they seek to improve their working conditions through
resort to administrative and judicial forums.” Id. at 2278 (quoting Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S.
556, 565–566 (1978)). The Seventh and Ninth Circuits affirmed the D.R. Horton rule, but the
Second, Fifth and Eighth Circuits rejected it. See Charlotte Garden, Disrupting Work Law: Arbi-
tration in the Gig Economy, 2017 U. CHI. LEG. FORUM 205, 227–28 (2017).
84. In Ernst & Young LLP v. Morris [E&Y], and in Lewis v. Epic Systems Corp., the employ-
ees alleged that the employer misclassified them as exempt from the Fair Labor Standards Act to
avoid paying overtime premiums. Epic Sys., 584 U.S. at 3 (2018); Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 15-cv-
82, 2015 WL 5330300, at *1 (W.D. Wis. Sept. 11, 2015), aff’d Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d
1147, 1161 (7th Cir. 2016), rev’d, Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1632 (2018). In Mur-
phy Oil, gas station personnel also alleged overtime violations, this time concealed by required
off-the-clock work “driving to the[ir competitors’] fuel stations . . . to monitor fuel prices and the
accuracy of their signage.” Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 361 NLRB No. 774, 776 (Oct. 28, 2014),
overruled by Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. NLRB, 808 F.3d 1013, 1019 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d Epic Sys.
Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1632 (2018).
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consequences of its decision as mere “policy arguments,”85 it em-
braced a formalist86 interpretation of the NLRA, as it has previously
done in expanding the FAA’s reach to most workplaces.87 Applying
the interpretive canon of ejusdem generis, Epic Systems limited the
NRLA’s protection of “concerted activities” to self-help activities in
the workplace, and not activities in the courtroom or arbitral forum.88
The Court’s formal division between workplace self-help protected by
the NLRA and a courtroom and arbitral forum governed by the FAA
permitted the Court to conclude that there is no tension between the
NLRA and the FAA’s enforcement of class waivers. In Epic Systems,
the Court held that however “debatable” the wisdom of class waivers,
the FAA requires that “arbitration agreements like those before us
must be enforced as written.”89
Epic Systems also evinces a hostility to legal theories that would
permit end runs around class waivers. It cautioned that courts “must
be alert to new devices and formulas” that would disfavor individual
arbitration.90 The Supreme Court dismissed its previous consideration
of the NLRA’s protection of collective grievances as encompassing
access to judicial forums as dicta, and the argument that the NRLA
can overcome a FLSA class waiver under the FAA as an “interpretive
triple bank shot.”91 The Court held that statutes must express “a clear
and manifest congressional command” to override the FAA’s enforce-
ment of class waivers in mandatory arbitration provisions.92 Shortly
after Epic Systems, the Supreme Court dispelled any doubt about its
strong preference for individual arbitration in Lamps Plus v. Varela,
in which the Court held that ambiguous arbitration agreements must
be interpreted to require individual, and not class arbitration.93
But, while this signals the fall of the class action in employment law,
it stops short of enforcing all waivers of aggregate litigation. In its sub-
85. Epic Sys., 138 S. Ct. at 1630–32.
86. By formalist, I mean a method of interpretation that favors canons of construction and
dictionary definitions to discern the original legislators’ meaning over other forms of authority,
such as statutory purpose, legislative history and practical consequences.
87. In 2001 the Court in Circuit City v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001) considered whether § 1 of
the FAA, which exempts “contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other
class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce,” excludes employment in interstate
commerce. The Court, invoking ejusdem generis, limited this clause to occupations similar to
seamen and railroad employees. Id. at 114–15, 121.
88. Epic Sys., 138 S. Ct. at 1625.
89. Id. at 1632.
90. Id. at 1623.
91. Id. at 1624, 1627.
92. Id.
93. 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1418–19 (2019).
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sequent FAA decision, New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, the Supreme Court
found that transportation workers who are independent contractors
are exempt from the FAA.94 The Court reached this outcome by dis-
cerning the original meaning of “contract for employment” for legisla-
tors at the time of the FAA’s enactment.95 As Oliveira suggests,
aggregate employment claims supported by a formalist interpretation
may yet survive Epic Systems.96
The states, moreover, continue to retain two important roles in
FAA jurisprudence. The FAA’s savings clause97 permits state contract
defenses, including limits on waiver of substantive rights (as opposed
to procedural rights such as participation in class or collective actions)
under state unconscionability doctrine.98 The FAA likewise provides
for judicial review of arbitrator misconduct and bias.99 And, impor-
tantly, Epic Systems did not disapprove of Waffle House, which per-
mits the EEOC to seek “victim-specific” relief in litigation pursuant to
its statutory authority, despite a mandatory arbitration provision that,
under the FAA, would bind the claimant alleging a statutory viola-
tion.100 The Supreme Court’s holding that the EEOC’s claim is not
“merely derivative” hinges on its independent authority under Title
VII to litigate claims involving violations of individual rights, and Title
VII’s specific grant to the EEOC of “exclusive authority over the
choice of forum and the prayer for relief once a charge has been
filed.”101 State agencies102 with similar statutory powers as the EEOC
94. 139 S. Ct. 532, 538 (2019).
95. Id. at 539–41 (reasoning that the legislators who enacted the FAA would have understood
“contracts for employment” to include independent contractors).
96. This Article expresses no opinion regarding the survival of qui tam or similar vehicles for
aggregate litigation should the Court adopt a more functionalist reading of the FAA.
97. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) (making agreements to arbitrate “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable,
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract”) (emphasis
added).
98. See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams (Adams II), 279 F.3d 889, 892 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 535 U.S. 1112 (2002).
99. See, e.g., Olson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 51 F.3d 157, 159 (8th Cir.
1995) (vacating arbitrator’s decision under FAA for failure to disclose financial relationship be-
tween arbitrator and defendant).
100. E.E.O.C. v. Waffle House Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 291–92, 294–96 (2002).
101. Id. at 297–98; see also Iskanian v. CLS Transp. Los Angeles, 59 Cal. 4th 348, 386 (Cal.
2014) (reasoning that the FAA did not prevent the EEOC from suing on behalf of an employee
as the EEOC is not “a proxy” for individuals and can prosecute action “without the employee’s
consent” and without any employee control over the litigation).
102. Whether a state agency can rely on Waffle House to seek victim-specific relief despite a
private nonparty’s waiver under the FAA was not squarely addressed in Waffle House, although
courts have extended Waffle House to state agencies with similar authority. See Rent-A-Center
v. Iowa Civil Rights Com’s, 843 N.W.2d 727, 736–38 (Iowa 2014) (finding that similar statutory
purpose of Iowa civil rights law and Title VII, and similar state agency power as EEOC, compel
result that state agency is not bound to private agreement in vindicating victim-specific rights
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may, therefore, continue to aggregate claims of victim-specific relief
after Epic Systems.
Despite the availability of unconscionability limitations on employ-
ment contracts and public agency enforcement of employment laws,
Epic Systems represents a substantial delegation of regulation of the
workplace to employers. The workplace is rarely the site of a bar-
gained-for exchange between parties, and as Professor Glover argues,
forcing class waivers on workers confers power “akin to lawmaking”
to employers that draft contracts of adhesion to “significantly reduce
or even remove [their] substantive legal obligations by eliminating
claiming.”103 After Epic Systems, employers may avoid class and col-
lective actions by requiring that employees accept mandatory arbitra-
tion with class waivers in employment contracts as a condition of
employment. The next Section will briefly describe empirical evidence
of the sharp drop in claims by employees subject to mandatory arbi-
tration and conclude that the FAA after Epic Systems is likely to
erode private enforcement of employment law claims.
B. The Impact of FAA Jurisprudence on Access to Justice and
Deterrence of Employment Law Violations
Mandatory arbitration with class waivers in employment contracts
have become increasingly common. The share of employees subject to
mandatory arbitration has risen from two percent in 1992 to over fifty-
five percent today. Many of these mandatory arbitration agreements
expressly require waiver of class claims.104 Even those that do not,
likely require individual arbitration after Lamps Plus. Mandatory ar-
bitration is most likely in the workplaces with the lowest average
income.105
under FAA); E.E.O.C. v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 300 F. Supp. 2d 637, 639–40 (N.D. Ill. 2004)
(reasoning that Waffle House’s reasoning extends to state agencies “working in tandem with the
EEOC”). The authority of an agency to seek victim-specific relief is separate from its authority
to seek penalties, the issue presented in aggrieved party qui tam claims, which will be discussed
infra Part III.
103. Glover, supra note 69, at 3054 (emphasis removed); see also Ronald G. Aronovsky, The
Supreme Court and the Future of Arbitration: Towards A Preemptive Federal Arbitration Proce-
dural Paradigm?, 42 SW. L. REV. 131, 152 & n.131 (2012) (“There are many reasons why busi-
nesses might wish to include arbitration clauses in adhesion contracts: One of them is to avoid
class action lawsuits.”).
104. ALEXANDER J.S. COLVIN, ECON. POLICY INST., THE GROWING USE OF MANDATORY
ARBITRATION: ACCESS TO THE COURTS IS NOW BARRED FOR MORE THAN 6 MILLION AMERI-
CAN WORKERS (2018).
105. Id. at tbl. 4; (showing that nearly two-thirds of workplaces that pay less than $13 per hour
require mandatory arbitration).
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The backdrop of FAA preemption litigation is the necessity of pri-
vate enforcement for deterrence, particularly of substantive law viola-
tions that harm vulnerable individuals. Deterrence is a recurring
concern for the dissenting voices in the Supreme Court’s FAA juris-
prudence. As Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg warned in Epic Systems,
“The inevitable result of today’s decision will be the under-enforce-
ment of federal and state statutes designed to advance the well-being
of vulnerable workers.”106 Scholars have similarly raised the under-
enforcement alarm.107
The debate about whether mandatory arbitration with class waivers
will suppress claims or instead channel would-be class action members
into individual, or bipartite, arbitration is now the subject of consider-
able inquiry. This Section will first summarize studies strongly sug-
gesting that the rise of mandatory arbitration has degraded deterrence
and access to justice for claimants. It will then highlight types of low-
value and difficult-to-prove workplace claims that Epic Systems is par-
ticularly likely to foreclose.
1. Mandatory Arbitration Undermines Access to Justice for and
Deterrence of Employment Law Violations
Until recently, it was unclear whether mandatory arbitration agree-
ments with class waivers undermine employment law compliance by
dissuading employees with legitimate claims from filing them. If, as
the Supreme Court has assumed, arbitration provides “for efficient,
streamlined procedures tailored to the type of dispute,”108 employees
with low-value claims who would otherwise have participated as class
members (or perhaps who have been locked out of courts entirely be-
cause of their cost and hassle) will instead opt for individual
arbitration.109
Recently, two strands of research questioned these assumptions.
The first examines the fairness of individual arbitration. Despite state
unconscionability doctrines that will not enforce mandatory agree-
ments that violate public policy, an investigation of 25,000 arbitrations
by the New York Times in 2015 “uncovered many troubling cases,”
106. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1647 (2018) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
107. Glover, supra note 69, at 3054.
108. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Conceptio´n, 563 U.S. 333, 344 (2011).
109. See, e.g., Samuel Estreicher & Matt Ballard, Affordable Justice Through Arbitration: A
Critique of Public Citizen’s Jeremaiad on the Costs of Arbitration, DISP. RESOL. J., Nov. 2002-Jan.
2003, at 8, 14 (arguing that arbitration is a more realistic route for the general public to assert
claims than court); Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate Over
Predispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 559, 563–64
(2001).
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\69-2\DPL215.txt unknown Seq: 25 27-APR-20 17:54
2020] THE STATE QUI TAM 381
including arbitrary procedures, substantial employee arbitration fees,
and financial relationships between employers and arbitrators.110 Ac-
cording to the investigation, arbitration “proceedings can devolve into
legal free-for-alls. Companies have paid employees to testify in their
favor. A hearing that lasted six hours cost the plaintiff $150,000. . . . To
deliver favorable outcomes to companies, some arbitrators have
twisted or outright disregarded the law, interviews and records
show.”111 Interviews with dozens of arbitrators revealed that when is-
suing decisions they are concerned about “the threat of losing busi-
ness.”112 The picture that emerges is that employers may prize
arbitration not for its efficiency, but because of their substantial ad-
vantage as repeat players, while employees face steep financial disin-
centives to arbitrate claims.
Empirical evidence supports the view that individual arbitrations
favor employers. Alexander Colvin—comparing employment arbitra-
tions and comparable employment federal and state litigation—found
that employment claims in arbitration had a lower win rate than litiga-
tion, and that those employee claimants who prevailed were awarded
a fraction of analogous, prevailing claims in court.113 Similar studies of
consumer protection arbitrations have arrived at the same
conclusion.114
These data suggest that the proliferation of mandatory arbitration
agreements (MAAs) likely restricts access to justice. To be sure,
whether arbitrations are more or less fair or effective than litigation
110. Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Michael Corkery, In Arbitration, a ‘Privatization of the Jus-
tice System’, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2015).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Alexander Colvin, An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration: Case Outcomes and
Processes, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEG. STU. 1, 6 (2011) [hereinafter Colvin, An Empirical Study of
Employment Arbitration] (finding that employee win rate and median award amount are lower
in arbitration than litigation, and lower still if the employer is a repeat player). But see NDP
ANALYTICS, supra note 19 (Chamber of Commerce-funded study comparing individual, federal
employment claims and employment arbitrations found higher awards and win rates in arbitra-
tion.). The NDP Analytics study does not cite or discuss the Colvin study (or any previous stud-
ies), and excludes class and state claims from its analysis, which according to the Colvin study
tend to have higher awards and win rates. Id. at 4–5, 15.
114. See, e.g., David Horton & Andrea Cann Chandrasekher, After the Revolution: An Empir-
ical Study of Consumer Arbitration, 104 GEO. L. J. 57, 99 (2015) (One study of consumer arbitra-
tions found that companies amassed far higher win rates by gaining expertise in the arbitral
forum, compared with the consumer-side bar.). As an example, a 2015 Consumer Financial Pro-
tection Bureau report found that while 29 million account holders received $1 billion from class
claims of illegal overdraft fees, no more than 32 of the 341 account holders who arbitrated over-
draft fees prevailed in individual arbitration. Alison Frankel, ‘Most revealing’ CFPB evidence on
class actions? Overdraft fee case study, REUTERS (Mar. 13, 2015), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-
frankel/2015/03/13/most-revealing-cfpb-evidence-on-class-actions-overdraft-fee-case-study/.
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for any particular claim remains contestable. Even if arbitration is, on
balance, less fair than litigation, one might plausibly argue that deter-
rence may be preserved so long as claimants bring forward an equal
number of meritorious claims in an arbitral forum. This has led to a
second strand of research about the impact of MAAs on deterrence.
Recent empirical evidence by Cynthia Estlund shows that MAAs al-
most certainly suppress employment claims.
To test the hypothesis that employees subject to MAAs are dis-
suaded from filing claims, Professor Estlund compared 2016 employ-
ment claims data in federal and state court and in arbitration
proceedings.115 During this period, the forty-four percent of private-
sector, non-union employees who are not subject to MAAs filed
31,000 federal and 195,000 state individual and class employment law
cases, representing approximately 550,000 individual employee
claims.116 In contrast, the fifty-six percent of private-sector, non-union
employees who are subject to MAAs filed only 5,126 notices of em-
ployment law arbitrations.117 This leaves, assuming equivalent levels
of employment law violations, “[b]etween 315,000 and 722,000 ‘miss-
ing’ arbitration cases.”118 As Professor Estlund cautions, the secrecy
of arbitration confines any quantitative analysis to no more than an
estimate.119 But the fact that employees in private-sector, non-union
workplaces subject to MAAs, who are over half of employees in the
United States, file only about one percent (or fewer) of the claims
filed by other half, leaves little doubt that MAAs reduce the threat of
private adjudication as a deterrent of employment law violations.
Even if the immediate impact of Epic Systems is discouraging, any
predictions about the future of access to justice and deterrence is con-
tingent on how stakeholders—namely arbitration associations, the
states, class action attorneys, employees, unions, and worker associa-
tions—react. First, arbitration associations can voluntarily impose due
process requirements on arbitrations to improve their fairness.120 But
the empirical evidence suggests a strong repeat player effect in favor
115. Estlund, supra note 21.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 689, 696–97.
119. Id. at 680. Employees subject to MAAs, for example, may be more likely to settle poten-
tial claims before filing a notice of arbitration than before filing a summons and complaint.
Given that arbitration is less expensive and more efficient than litigation, one would expect the
reverse to be true. But even if true, the vast difference in claiming suggests that any difference
this might make to overall claiming is likely to be small and will not impact Professor Estlund’s
bottom-line conclusion that MAAs adversely affect deterrence.
120. The American Arbitration Association has, for example, addressed the problem of un-
reasonable arbitration fees by capping fees for employees at $300. See AMERICAN ARBITRATION
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of employers, regardless of the formal due process protections that
apply.121 It is also unclear why employers, emboldened by a strong
federal policy that does not condition its preference for arbitration on
due process protections, will not respond to the robust due process
guarantees of some arbitration associations by selecting associations
without them.122
State unconscionability standards remain an important safeguard
against this race to the bottom, by protecting against one-sided arbi-
tration terms in contracts of adhesion.123 States with strong unconscio-
nability standards may respond by striking down and limiting one-
sided arbitration terms in ways that improve the fairness of the arbi-
tral forum.124 After Epic Systems, however, states may not prohibit
waivers of employment class claims. As a result, state public policy
standards that require procedural and substantive fairness cannot pre-
serve employment law claims that cannot be effectively vindicated in
individual arbitration.
Next, class action employment attorneys may adapt and become
“arbitration entrepreneurs,”125 substituting lost class actions with mass
arbitrations. Martin Malin predicts that plaintiff-side employment
ASSOCIATION (AAA), EMPLOYMENT/WORKPLACE FEE SCHEDULE (Oct. 1, 2017), https://
go.adr.org/rs/294-SFS-516/images/Employment%20Arbitration%20Fee%20Schedule.pdf.
121. See, e.g., Colvin, An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration, supra note 113.
122. See, e.g., Alison Frankel, After Postmates Again Balks at Arbitration Fees, Workers Seek
Contempt Order, REUTERS (Dec. 2, 2019) (reporting that one employer responded to demands
by 6,000 claimants to arbitrate claims at AAA by switching to a smaller arbitration association
that permits employers to delay the arbitration process longer than AAA does).
123. To this point, state qui tam statutes are only effective if they are nonwaivable. State
public policy, reflected in the contract defense of unconscionability, plays a central role in qui
tam enforcement in invalidating MAAs that require waiver of qui tam enforcement. See Is-
kanian v. CLS Transp. Los Angeles, 59 Cal. 4th 348, 383 (Cal. 2014) (finding that “an employee’s
right to bring a PAGA action is unwaivable”). Unconscionability doctrine also invalidates waiv-
ers of the right to a remedy from qui tam enforcement on the same ground. See, e.g., Gessa v.
Manor Care of Fla., Inc., 86 So. 3d 484, 493 (Fla. 2011) (finding limitation of liability that “frus-
trate the remedies created by” statute void as contrary to public policy); Armendariz v. Found.
Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 83, 103–04 (2000) (“The principle that an arbitration
agreement may not limit statutorily imposed remedies such as punitive damages and attorney
fees appears to be undisputed.”); In re Poly-Am., L.P., 262 S.W.3d 337, 352 (Tex. 2008) (“Permit-
ting an employer to contractually absolve itself of this statutory remedy would undermine the
deterrent purpose of the Workers’ Compensation Act’s anti-retaliation provisions.”).
124. Kentucky after Epic Systems amended its laws to require that MAAs have fair proce-
dures to select arbitrators and conduct hearings, and to ban unreasonable fees and disqualify
conflicted arbitrators. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 336.700(3) (West 2019). New Jersey recently en-
acted a law declaring enforceable as against public policy the waiver in an MAA “any substan-
tive or procedural right or remedy relating” to a state employment discrimination claim. S.B.
121, 218th Leg. (N.J. 2019).
125. Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 114, at 63 (referring to consumer class action attor-
neys who “have tried to overcome their inability to aggregate disputes by bringing scores of
discrete proceedings against the same company”).
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lawyers will adapt to Epic Systems by filing “hundreds, and in some
cases thousands, of individual arbitration demands,” which could
eliminate the employer’s strategic advantage in the arbitral setting.126
There is some evidence of this. After Epic Systems, the Ninth Circuit
decertified O’Connor v. Uber—a 240,000-member class action that al-
leged that Uber failed to reimburse drivers for tips and expenses—
from class action attorneys who filed thousands of notices of arbitra-
tion on behalf of class members after the decertification of their
class.127 After the decertification, Uber agreed to pay that class of
drivers a fraction of its previous potential liability to resolve their
claims,128 but 60,000 class members rejected the settlement and in-
stead filed notices of individual arbitration.129 Uber, facing $18.7 mil-
lion in fees for the individual arbitrations, instead resolved the
individual drivers’ claims for at least $146 million.130 This is less than
the estimated value of the claims, particularly the PAGA claim with
an estimated worth of $1 billion, but is significantly more than a pro-
posed settlement of $100 million rejected by the court in O’Connor.131
Attorneys representing employees have pursued a similar strategy in
wage claims involving other high-profile companies.132
While the individual arbitrations after O’Connor shows the poten-
tial of mass arbitration to assert a collective grievance, it is unclear
whether they can substitute for the deterrence of class claims. As
Charlotte Garden argues, the O’Connor plaintiffs’ counsel’s pledge
following class decertification to represent class members in arbitra-
tion “is likely an artifact of the investment of time and money that
class counsel has already made in the case.”133 That is, assuming that
the value of individual claims exceed the costs of arbitration, class
counsel who have already invested resources in developing and litigat-
126. See Martin Malin, Where Have All the Claims Gone?, JOTWELL (Oct. 18, 2018), https://
worklaw.jotwell.com/where-have-all-the-claims-gone/ (reviewing Estlund, supra note 21).
127. O’Connor v. Uber Tech. Inc., 904 F.3d 1087, 1091–92 (9th Cir. 2018); Abadilla v. Uber
Technologies, 3:18-cv-7343, Pet. Or. Compelling Arbitration ¶ 1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2018).
128. Heather Somerville, Uber to Pay $20 Million to Settle Long-Running Legal Battle with
Drivers, REUTERS (Mar. 12, 2019).
129. Joel Rosenblatt, Uber’s Arbitration Addiction Could be Death by 60,000 Cuts, BLOOM-
BERG, May 8, 2019.
130. Andrew Wallender, Uber Settles ‘Majority’ of Arbitrations for at least $146M, BLOOM-
BERG, May 9, 2019.
131. David Fisher, Judge Rejects Uber Settlement, Saying It Lowballs California Labor Claims,
FORBES (Aug. 18, 2016).
132. See Frankel, supra note 122 (reporting over 6,000 individual arbitration notices of wage-
and-hour claims against DoorDash and over 6,000 against Postmates); Andrew Wallender, Cor-
porate Arbitration Tactic Backfires as Claim Flood In, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 11, 2019) (3,420 arbi-
tration claims against Lyft).
133. Garden, supra note 83.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\69-2\DPL215.txt unknown Seq: 29 27-APR-20 17:54
2020] THE STATE QUI TAM 385
ing a class claim have little to lose by notifying class members and
expressing a willingness to represent them individually and file notices
on their behalf. For these decertified claims, filing mass arbitration
notices is a rational attempt by class counsel to recoup sunk costs. In
contrast, the costs and risks entailed in developing a mass arbitration
from scratch seem far greater.134 This would require (a) identifying
mass numbers of claimants with claims that can be effectively vindi-
cated in individual arbitration, and (b) taking a calculated risk that a
sufficient number of them will be willing to submit a claim (despite
attorney solicitation restrictions, substantial arbitration fees, and the
possibility of having to pay for individualized discovery and proceed-
ings).135 These costs, then, pose a significant barrier for class attorneys
seeking to become arbitration entrepreneurs, particularly for low-
value and difficult-to-prove claims that could previously be aggre-
gated in a class claim.
The history of class action consumer protection cases after Concep-
cio´n instructs why this is likely to be the case. Like the Uber plaintiffs’
counsel after Epic Systems, Concepcio´n led those class-action attor-
neys to represent many former AT&T class members in arbitration.136
But the over-1,000 arbitration notices filed by AT&T class members
after Concepcio´n was a short-term trend. David Horton and Andrea
Cann Chandrasekher found that, excluding the AT&T class members
from the sample, post-Concepcio´n consumer protection filings show a
modest increase in arbitrations from about fifty to eighty arbitrations
per month, but do not approach the loss of class claims after Concep-
cio´n.137 While some “arbitration entrepreneurs” specialize in batches
of consumer protection arbitrations, “unlike traditional class action at-
torneys, who frequently represent thousands of plaintiffs, arbitration
entrepreneurs string together a few dozen consumers at most.”138 This
post-Concepcio´n history of consumer protection claims suggests that
134. As one attorney representing employees in individual arbitrations after the decertifica-
tion of their class action explains, “Had the claimants not already been in a collective action, the
mass arbitration strategy likely wouldn’t have been possible,” because of the low value of the
individual claims and the high cost of coordinating arbitration filings. Wallender, supra note 130.
135. In this way, arbitrations impose greater costs than FLSA collective actions. Compared to
class actions, the opt-in requirement of collective actions imposes a significant cost on attorneys
in obtaining written consent and on plaintiffs in exposing themselves to the possibility of retalia-
tion. But collective actions are far more efficient than individual arbitrations in affording a col-
lective means to discover and introduce evidence and to aggregate claims in a single proceeding.
136. Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 114, at 92.
137. See id.
138. Id. at 93–95 (reporting that nearly half of all consumer arbitration filings in 2012 came
from a single law firm representing consumers against AT&T after the Supreme Court held in
Conceptio´n that their collective claim required individual arbitrations).
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pledges to represent class members in arbitration are likely contingent
on the willingness of plaintiff-side counsel to invest ex ante resources
in identifying class claims. This appears unlikely to replace the loss of
class claims after Epic Systems.
Lastly, there is also the possibility that employees will successfully
persuade their employers to drop mandatory arbitration through pub-
lic pressure. Google, for example, recently eliminated its mandatory
arbitration requirements after several high-profile campaigns by em-
ployees in protest of them.139 But Uber did not react to the mass arbi-
trations following O’Connor by dropping mandatory arbitration, even
though it had previously eliminated sexual harassment from its scope
in response to public criticism.140 This suggests that a company’s deci-
sion to eliminate forced arbitration is guided by collective employee
and public pressure rather than the economic risk of mass arbitration.
Unless public pressure ultimately yields legislation limiting mandatory
arbitration for all employees, public pressure is most likely to impact
the workplaces of employees who have significant bargaining power.
This would still leave incentives in place for employers of low-wage,
unorganized employees to adopt mandatory arbitration with class
waivers to reduce labor costs.
Enforcement of class waivers is particularly likely to undermine de-
terrence of and access to justice for low-value or difficult-to-litigate
employment and employment discrimination claims. A low-wage
worker stands little chance of persuading an attorney to represent her
low-value minimum wage claim individually in arbitration. The mis-
classification claims at issue in Epic Systems suffer the additional dis-
advantage of being factually complex, requiring application of an
unstructured, multi-factor test to determine if the individual is an in-
dependent contractor or employee.141 Epic Systems is also likely to
erode deterrence and access to justice for employment discrimination
claims that, because they require representative or expert evidence,
are inefficient, or impossible, to individually arbitrate. The Second
Circuit, for example, has held that the FAA requires class waiver for
claims asserting a “pattern-or-practice” of discrimination in violation
of Title VII, because this claim cannot be maintained by individual
139. Kim Elsesser, Google Ditches Mandatory Arbitration Policy, FORBES (Feb. 22, 2019).
140. See Daisuke Wakabayasi, Uber Eliminates Forced Arbitration for Sexual Misconduct
Claims, N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 2018).
141. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (1958) (listing ten factors to determine
an agency relationship, including, for example, (a) right to control the details of the work; (b)
whether the putative agent is employed in a distinct business or occupation; (c) the method of
payment; and (d) whether the agency supplies the instrumentalities of the job).
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complainants.142 Disparate impact claims similarly require representa-
tive evidence and expert reports that are inefficient or impossible to
obtain in individual arbitration.
In short, MAAs are likely to foreclose claims that cannot be effec-
tively vindicated in an individual arbitration. State public policy stan-
dards, class action attorney adaptation, and employee self-help are
unlikely to reverse this trend. Whatever the exact extent of the decline
in claiming after Epic Systems, it seems beyond serious dispute that
MAAs with collective and class waivers have and will increasingly dis-
tort the private enforcement of employment laws.
In addition to eroding deterrence and access to justice, the lack of
litigation of these claims may make future resolution of them more
uncertain. To take the example of resolving the emergent debate
about whether Uber and Lyft drivers are employees or independent
contractors, fashioning rules to govern the work relationships in the
platform economy will require transparent, sophisticated determina-
tions of these claims. After Epic Systems, this is highly unlikely absent
a dramatic expansion of public enforcement or broader legislative
change.143 As with the settlement of individual arbitrations by Uber
drivers after the decertification of the O’Connor class claim, any
claims that proceed are likely to be resolved in confidential settlement
agreements or via individual arbitrations in cursory, conflicting deci-
sions that have no precedential weight.
2. The State Response of Privatizing Public Enforcement in Qui
Tam Claims Can Improve Access to Justice for and
Deterrence of Employment Law Violations
Since Epic Systems, seven states—Connecticut, Maine, Massachu-
setts, New York, Oregon, Vermont, and Washington—have contem-
plated qui tam claims to partially assign the state’s interest in penalties
142. See Chin v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 685 F.3d 135, 147 (2d Cir. 2012); Parisi v.
Goldman, Sachs & Co., 710 F.3d 483, 488 (2d Cir. 2013) (“Since private plaintiffs do not have a
right to bring a pattern-or-practice claim of discrimination, there can be no entitlement to the
ancillary class action procedural mechanism.”). Justice Ginsburg disagreed with this interpreta-
tion of the FAA in her Epic Systems dissent. See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1648
(2018) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“I do not read the Court’s opinion to place in jeopardy discrim-
ination complaints asserting disparate impact and pattern-or-practice claims that call for proof
on a group-wide basis.”).
143. Expanded, systemic enforcement is contingent on public agency capacity and resistance
to capture by the regulated entities. As an example of the latter, California recently enacted
A.B. 5, which presumes that contract workers such as drivers for Uber are employees under
state employment laws. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 2750.3(a); Conger & Scheiber, California Bill
Makes App-Based Companies Treat Workers as Employees, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2019), https://
www.nytimes.com/2019/09/11/technology/california-gig-economy-bill.html.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\69-2\DPL215.txt unknown Seq: 32 27-APR-20 17:54
388 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:357
to individuals to deter employment law violations. These bills track
PAGA in partially assigning state claims for penalties to aggrieved
parties but have sought to expand upon its ability to provide access to
justice and to deter employment law violations while protecting state
qui tam claims from potential threats. All bills, like PAGA, would as-
sign the state’s interest in employment law penalties to employees as
aggrieved parties and also to other whistleblowers with independent
knowledge of violations, including subcontractors and former employ-
ees and managers.144 Most bills would also permit labor organizations
and nonprofit corporations that regularly advocate on behalf of em-
ployees and that enforce labor standards to file qui tam claims by des-
ignation of aggrieved parties and whistleblowers, which would permit
individual relators to proceed confidentially.145 To address employer
objections that relators will over-enforce employment laws, most
states have contemplated expressly exempting some posting, report-
ing, and paystub violations from qui tam enforcement.146 The bills of
Massachusetts, Oregon, and Washington would also expressly prevent
employers from evading qui tam enforcement through self-help, by
prohibiting the contractual impairment of qui tam enforcement
through waiver.147 Lastly, and importantly for this Article, all bills
adopt a FCA approach to state intervention, permitting the state
agency to intervene in qui tam litigation even after the initial period
has elapsed, upon a showing of good cause.148
144. H.B. 5381, 2020 Gen. Assemb., Feb. Sess. § 1(a)(5) (Conn. 2020); S.B. 1066, 191st Gen.
Assemb. § 10 (Mass. 2019); S.P. 558, 129th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. No. 1693 §§ 840(A)(1), (6) (Me.
2019); Assemb. B. A2265, 2019 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 10 (N.Y. 2019); S.B. 750, 80th Leg.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. §§ 1(1), (7) (Or. 2019); S.B. 139, 2019 Leg. § 51(1), (8) (Vt. 2019); H.B. 1965,
66th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2(2) (Wash. 2019).
145. Conn. H.B. 5381 § 1(a)(4); Mass. S.B. 1066 § 10; Me. S.P. 558, No. 1693 § 840(A)(4);
N.Y. Assemb. B. A2265 § 10; Or. S.B. 750 § 1(4); Vt. S.B. 139 § 51(7); Wash. H.B. 1965 §§ 2(2),
3(9).
146. Conn. H.B. 5381 § 1(m); Mass. S.B. 1066 § 10; Me. S.P. 558, No. 1693 §§ 840(A)(1)-(3);
Vt. S.B. 139 § 52(g)(2); Wash. H.B. 1965 § 3(5)(a).
147. Mass. S.B. 1066 § 10; Or. S.B. 750 § 2(6); Wash. H.B. 1965 § 3(7). I thank Anthony Sebok
for raising this possibility. Under the unconscionability doctrine of many states, an arbitration
agreement that is a “prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue statutory remedies” is unen-
forceable as against public policy. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473
U.S. 614, 637 n.19 (1985); see, e.g., Blair v. Rent-A-Ctr., Inc., No. 17-17221, 2019 WL 2701333, at
*6–7 (9th Cir. June 28, 2019) (upholding on public policy grounds a state prohibition on waivers
of public injunctions against FAA preemption challenge). California courts have rejected
mandatory arbitration of PAGA claims on similar grounds. See Correia v. NB Baker Elec., Inc.,
32 Cal. App. 5th 602, 622 (Cal. Ct. App. 2019) (“Without the state’s consent, a predispute agree-
ment between an employee and an employer cannot be the basis for compelling arbitration of a
representative PAGA claim because the state is the owner of the claim and the real party in
interest, and the state was not a party to the arbitration agreement.”).
148. Conn. H.B. 5381 § 1(s); Mass. S.B. 1066 § 10; Me. S.P. 558, No. 1693 § 840(F)(7); N.Y.
Assemb. B. A2265 § 10; Or. S.B. 750 § 5(7); Vt. S.B. 139 § 53(d)(1)(b); Wash. H.B. 1965 § 6(b).
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If not subject to waiver in mandatory arbitration provisions, state
qui tam statutes may replace some of the state employment law claims
lost after Epic Systems.149 Aggrieved party, whistleblower, and repre-
sentative organization qui tam claims create low barriers to entry for
workers, unions, and worker organizations to assert—and plaintiff-
side attorneys to identify and litigate—employment claims that are
otherwise under-enforced after Epic Systems. Qui tam claims may fa-
cilitate mass arbitrations in what Professor Gilles calls an “arbitration-
enabler model,” in which an enforcer “obtains in court a liability de-
termination that can serve as a predicate for the application of non-
mutual offensive collateral estoppel in subsequent one-on-one
arbitrations by consumers and employees.”150 Permitting representa-
tive third-party intermediaries, such as nonprofit corporations, to file
claims on behalf of confidential relators may further improve access to
justice by lowering the risk of retaliation against individual complain-
ants. As the California agency tasked with monitoring PAGA filings
has concluded, qui tam notices may provide agencies with “high qual-
ity leads identifying serious violations that in many cases would other-
wise have remained underground.”151 Qui tam statutes can focus on
particular types of employment laws to encourage complaints about
violations that public agencies lack the resources (or leads) to enforce
themselves.
While qui tam statutes can improve access to justice and deterrence
after Epic Systems, their use by states raises pressing doctrinal and
normative concerns. The next Part will first evaluate the risk of FAA
preemption, finding that Epic Systems presents a new threat that qui
tam statutes in aggregating low-value penalties are preempted under
the FAA as an end run around class waivers. It will then assess extant
due process limitations to qui tam enforcement, finding that they fail
to address this threat or the principal-agent problems that can result
Some states also permit the state agency to disqualify relator counsel based on past unprofes-
sional conduct or for failure to adequately represent relators. See, e.g., Mass. S.B. 1066 § 10; Me.
S.P. 558, No. 1693 § 840(F)(6).
149. Most states have wage-and-hour laws, and all states have employment discrimination
laws, at least as protective as FLSA and Title VII. See DEP’T OF LABOR, WAGE AND HOUR
DIVISION, CONSOLIDATED MINIMUM WAGE TABLE (2019), https://www.dol.gov/whd/minwage/
mw-consolidated.htm (29 states and the District of Columbia have minimum wage rates higher
than the federal minimum wage in FLSA); NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATES LEGISLATURES,
STATE EMPLOYMENT-RELATED DISCRIMINATION STATUTES (July 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/
documents/employ/Discrimination-Chart-2015.pdf.
150. Gilles, supra note 24, at 2234–36.
151. DEP’T OF LABOR STANDARDS ENF’T, BUDGET CHANGE PROPOSAL FY 2019-20 3 (2019),
[hereinafter Dlse Budget Proposal 2019], https://esd.dof.ca.gov/Documents/bcp/1920/
FY1920_ORG7350_BCP3230.pdf.
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from loose state agency oversight over private qui tam enforcement. It
concludes that addressing these risks will require measures to ensure
that qui tam enforcement serves a distinct, public purpose and ade-
quately represents the interests of the states and affected employees.
III. DOCTRINAL THREATS TO QUI TAM STATUTES AFTER EPIC
SYSTEMS AND THE RISK OF PRIVATE ENFORCER MISUSE
OF QUI TAM ENFORCEMENT
This Part will first evaluate doctrinal threats to state qui tam stat-
utes. It then turns to the risks of private enforcer misuse of qui tam
enforcement.
There is little chance that qui tam statutes modeled on the federal
FCA will be found unconstitutional or entirely preempted by the
FAA. For a formalist Supreme Court, the FAA gains no purchase in
qui tam claims because the government holds the interest in a qui tam
claim and the government is not a party to the employment contract.
The long history of qui tam statutes, the Court’s favorable view of
privatizing enforcement, and the presumption against preemption of
state laws that regulate the workplace all suggest that Epic Systems
leaves undisturbed state qui tam statutes that partially assign the
state’s interest in employment law penalties.
But Epic Systems suggests a new threat to qui tam statutes. Epic
Systems displays a hostility to claims that would provide an end run
around the Court’s enforcement of mandatory arbitration and class
waivers, and aggrieved party qui tam statutes can permit a private
party to aggregate penalties in a manner that closely resembles a class
claim.152 PAGA, additionally, provides no express means for the state
to intervene in qui tam claims after an initial period, and yet binds the
state to the private enforcer’s resolution of the claim. PAGA’s loose
oversight and aggregation of penalties that closely track victim-spe-
cific violations has led to significant challenges of PAGA as a class
action in disguise.
The Ninth Circuit, partially relying on Waffle House, has upheld
PAGA against this challenge by concluding that state penalties are
conceptually distinct from and do not present the same procedural
complexity as victim-specific relief.153 But the state qui tam vehicle
can place considerable pressure on the distinction between public and
152. As Professor Gilles and Mr. Friedman argue, the aggrieved party qui tam jurisdictional
bar provides “an avenue for redress of private harms, even as it also furthers public objectives,
[and as a result] . . . begins to look a lot like a class action.” Gilles & Friedman, The New Qui
Tam, supra note 25, at 520.
153. Sakkab v. Luxottica Retail N. Am., Inc., 803 F.3d 425, 435–38 (9th Cir. 2015).
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\69-2\DPL215.txt unknown Seq: 35 27-APR-20 17:54
2020] THE STATE QUI TAM 391
private interests in an enforcement action. Reinforcing this distinction
will be necessary to avoid destabilizing Waffle House, which permits
public agencies to enforce private claims notwithstanding a mandatory
arbitration agreement.154 While current due process limitations on qui
tam penalties deter some forms of private enforcer abuse, they do lit-
tle to preserve the boundary between public and private enforcement
or to ensure that qui tam enforcement advances the public interest.155
This Part will conclude that new constraints, many of which exist in
state constitutional law and in bills by states contemplating qui tam
expansion, are in order to preserve qui tam enforcement from FAA
preemption.
A. Previous Constitutional and FAA Challenges
of Qui Tam Statutes
Qui tam statutes have proven surprisingly resilient in resisting con-
stitutional and FAA challenges. Attacks on state delegations to pri-
vate enforcers must overcome several hurdles, beginning with a
judicial tolerance of privatization. Gillian Metzger, in her account of
judicial scrutiny of federal privatization, concludes that “[a]lmost all
private delegations are upheld.”156 Professor Metzger attributes this
tolerance to the sanctioning of broad power to the executive for eco-
nomic and social regulation in the post-Lochner era.157 While the Su-
preme Court continues to draw a distinction between public and
private in the state action doctrine, “its private delegation cases signal
the Court’s acceptance of the difficulty in singling out a category of
private delegations for special constitutional scrutiny.”158
There is no shortage of cases in which courts have upheld the state
delegation of public functions to private individuals, from the priva-
tization of law enforcement159 to the FAA’s privatization of the judici-
ary. Given the judiciary’s tolerance of private delegations for
economic and social regulation,160 it is unsurprising that there is no
serious federal separation of powers challenge to qui tam claims. The
154. I thank Margaret Lemos for raising this concern.
155. The claim here is not that class actions necessarily advance a public interest, but rather
that a qui tam claim need not meet class requirements because it belongs to the state and not
private individuals. But in order to belong to the state, it must advance a distinct public interest.
156. Gillian Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1440 (2003).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1443.
159. Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Outsourcing Criminal Prosecution? The Limits of Criminal Justice
Privatization, 2010 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 265, 273–75 (2010).
160. See, e.g., Beary Landscaping, Inc. v. Costigan, 667 F.3d 947, 951 (7th Cir. 2012) (rejecting
nondelegation doctrine challenge to state delegation of prevailing wage rates to private parties).
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FCA, in which DOJ retains the authority to intervene as the primary
litigator, and to move to dismiss or settle the action, appears to re-
serve sufficient power for the agency to withstand separation of pow-
ers scrutiny.161 The Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have taken
this position.162 The partial nature of the FCA assignment, then, does
not violate federal separation of powers.163
Federal constitutional standing presents a more complicated ques-
tion, despite the Supreme Court’s instruction in Vermont Agency of
Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens,164 that there is “no
room for doubt that a qui tam relator under the FCA has Article III
standing.”165 While the state suffers a cognizable injury in an FCA
claim, under familiar Article III standing doctrine it is “the com-
plaining party”166 that must allege facts sufficient to satisfy the case-
or-controversy requirement. The Court rejected the argument that the
relator acts as an agent of the state, noting that the relator has too
much discretion in an FCA claim to constitute a mere agent. Qui tam
claims confer upon the relator an interest in the suit, which the relator
may litigate without the state’s involvement, and even if the state in-
tervenes the relator remains a party to the claim. Nor is the relator’s
interest in the bounty sufficient to confer standing, unless related to
the state’s injury in fact. Nevertheless, standing is satisfied in a qui tam
claim where the state has effected “a partial assignment of the Gov-
ernment’s damages claim.”167 Recognizing the qui tam vehicle as a
form of “representational standing,” the Court held that the state’s
“injury in fact suffices to confer standing” on the relator.168
161. See United States v. Shasta Servs., Inc., 440 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1113–14 (E.D. Cal. 2006);
U.S. ex rel. K & R Ltd. P’ship v. Mass. Hous. Fin. Agency, 154 F. Supp. 2d 19, 25–26 (D.D.C.
2001); Friedman v. Rite Aid Corp., 152 F. Supp. 2d 766, 771–72 (E.D. Penn. 2001) (“Therefore,
even if it initially declines to intervene, the Government retains a significant right to influence
and participate in a qui tam action.”); Myriam E. Gilles, Representational Standing: United
States ex rel. Stevens and the Future of Public Law Litigation, 89 CAL. L. REV. 315, 367 (2001).
162. See United States ex rel. Stone v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 282 F.3d 787, 806 (10th Cir. 2002);
Riley v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hosp., 252 F.3d 749, 753 (5th Cir. 2001) (finding that “significant
control over litigation pursued under the FCA by a qui tam relator” satisfies the Take Care
Clause); United States ex rel. Taxpayers Against Fraud v. Gen. Elec. Co., 41 F.3d 1032 (6th Cir.
1994); United States ex rel. Kelly v. Boeing Co., 9 F.3d 743, 755 (9th Cir. 1993).
163. Gilles, supra note 161, at 346. Federal courts have declined to strike down delegations to
private entities since Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936). I will argue in Part IV, infra,
that state nondelegation doctrine often imposes greater constraints on the privatization of public
enforcement.
164. 529 U.S. 765 (2000).
165. Id. at 773–779.
166. Id. at 771.
167. Id. at 773.
168. Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\69-2\DPL215.txt unknown Seq: 37 27-APR-20 17:54
2020] THE STATE QUI TAM 393
Vermont Agency of Natural Resources leaves little doubt that harm
to the state is sufficient to satisfy federal constitutional standing for a
relator to litigate a qui tam claim. It establishes that a relator has
standing to assert an injury in fact of the state where a statute effects a
partial assignment to the relator. It, however, left open the question of
what specific types of harmed state interests are properly the subject
of a qui tam claim.
Because the FCA primarily concerns the state’s proprietary interest
in deterring financial fraud against the state, one might reasonably
limit the holding in Vermont Agency of Natural Resources to the par-
tial assignment of state pecuniary harm.169 The Supreme Court’s for-
malist approach, however, is likely to find state sovereign interests in
creating and enforcing public law sufficient to satisfy Article III stand-
ing requirements despite the lack of state pecuniary harm and the de
facto advancement of private interests. Supreme Court jurisprudence
is relaxed in identifying state interests sufficient to satisfy the injury-
in-fact requirement, so long as the state alleges “an invasion of a le-
gally protected interest.”170 As the Supreme Court reasoned in Massa-
chusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency,171 “[s]tates are not
normal litigants for the purposes of invoking federal jurisdiction,”172
which does not demand an involved analysis of state interests. This is
why Vermont Agency of Natural Resources, despite its careful analysis
of the qui tam claim as a partial assignment, does not distinguish be-
tween the sovereign and pecuniary interests in FCA claims.173
This “special position and interest” of the states in federal court,174
and the “long and unbroken tradition” of the qui tam statute in the
169. Myriam Gilles has previously argued that Article III standing would not permit the par-
tial assignment of a state’s interest in enforcing a civil penalty. Gilles, supra note 161, at 341–45.
Professor Gilles and Mr. Friedman also appear to reach this conclusion in limiting qui tam claims
“grounded in a theory of assignment” to those in which “the government has suffered injury to
its property,” while arguing in favor of a more restrictive “agency model” for “the government’s
general enforcement powers, and not on any injury-in-fact the government happens to have
suffered in its proprietary capacity.” Gilles & Friedman, The New Qui Tam, supra note 25, at
522–23.
170. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992); see also Massachusetts v. EPA,
549 U.S. 497, 518–21 (2007).
171. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 518–21.
172. Id. at 518. In that case, the “well-founded desire to preserve” their sovereign territory
suffices to establish their Article III standing to sue the EPA to regulate heat-trapping gasses. Id.
173. 529 U.S. 765, 771 (2000) (identifying as separate injuries to the state “the injury to its
sovereignty arising from the violation of its laws . . . and the proprietary injury resulting from the
alleged fraud”) (emphasis added).
174. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 498.
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United States,175 all strongly suggest that a qui tam claim grounded in
state sovereign interests meets Article III standing requirements. This
is because intangible harms such as state sovereign interests are le-
gally protected if the injury is traditionally regarded as a basis for a
suit and if the legislature identifies it as such.176 The Supreme Court
has previously found “the exercise of sovereign power over individu-
als and entities within the relevant jurisdiction[, including] the power
to create and enforce a legal code,” to constitute a state sovereign
interest.177 This interest extends with special force to employment law,
as states have “broad authority under their police powers to regulate
the employment relationship to protect workers within the State.”178
The Supreme Court’s relaxed standing requirements for states is likely
satisfied for qui tam statutes enacted to protect the state’s sovereign
interest in deterring the growth of the underground economy, harm to
vulnerable workers, and loss of tax revenue. The California Supreme
Court reached this conclusion in upholding PAGA, finding that the
agency may properly assign its sovereign interests in penalties to deter
employment law violations that threaten the health and well-being of
its residents.179 This holding seems consistent with Vermont Agency of
Natural Resources. The partial assignability of sovereign interests in
penalties is demonstrated in the FCA itself, which also permits recov-
ery of penalties.180 In permitting FCA penalties as a component of the
relator’s bounty, Vermont Agency of Natural Resources strongly sug-
gests that the state may partially assign proprietary and sovereign in-
terests in penalties to deter violations of public law. Challenges to
FCA partial assignment of penalties on this ground have been rejected
by the Fourth, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits.181 Courts since then have
consistently relied on Vermont Agency of Natural Resources to find
175. Sprint Commc’ns Co. v. APCC Servs., 554 U.S. 269, 311 (2008) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting).
176. Spokeo v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016).
177. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 756 (1985).
178. Id.
179. See Iskanian v. CLS Transp. Los Angeles, LLC, 59 Cal. 4th 348, 388 (2014) (“There is no
question that the enactment and enforcement of laws concerning wages, hours, and other terms
of employment is within the state’s historic police power.”) (citing Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 756 (1985)). See generally Margaret S. Thomas, Parens Patriae and
the States’ Historic Police Power, 69 SMU L. REV. 759, 806 (2016).
180. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(b)(4) (West 2017).
181. United States ex rel. Bunk v. Gosselin World Wide Moving, N.V., 741 F.3d 390, 404 (4th
Cir. 2013); United States ex rel. Stone v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 282 F.3d 787, 804 (10th Cir. 2002),
rev’d on other grounds, 549 U.S. 457, 479 (2007); Riley v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hosp., 252 F.3d
749, 752 n.3 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc).
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that private enforcers have standing to seek civil penalties from their
assigned interest by the state.182
Even if Article III were to require financial harm of the state neces-
sary to support a partial assignment for federal standing, standing in
state court is not controlled by Article III. Claimants enforcing state
qui tam statutes, like California’s PAGA, need not satisfy Article III
standing if litigated in a state court with looser standing require-
ments.183 The Ninth Circuit has held that PAGA suits are not remova-
ble under the Class Action Fairness Act184 and that PAGA penalties
may not be aggregated for the purposes of diversity jurisdiction be-
cause “[t]he state, as the real party in interest, is not a ‘citizen’ for
diversity purposes.”185 As Zachary Clopton explains, assuming no
other grounds for removal, state qui tam claims “can be maintained in
state court even if a federal court found no standing.”186 Qui tam pri-
vate enforcers, then, appear to have standing—at least in state court—
to vindicate the partially assigned states’ interest in civil penalties.
A formalist interpretation of the FAA would similarly find that qui
tam statutes do not implicate the FAA since, as the Ninth Circuit held
in United States ex rel. Welch v. My Left Foot Children’s Therapy,187
the state is not a party to the contract. In Welch, the defendant chal-
lenged an FCA claim by an employee that her employer made false
Medicaid claims on the ground that the FAA requires enforcement of
the employment agreement, which required arbitration of any claim
that the relator may “have against” the defendant.188 But since “FCA
fraud claims always belong to the government, [the relator] cannot be
said to own or possess them,” and the FCA claim was not arbitrable
despite the government’s election not to intervene.189 No court has
held that a defendant can enforce an FCA waiver.
182. See United States ex rel. Bunk, 741 F.3d at 404 (holding that “relators seeking solely civil
penalties enjoy standing to sue”); Stauffer v. Brooks Bros., Inc., 619 F.3d 1321, 1327 (Fed. Cir.
2010) (same); United States v. Halifax Hosp. Med. Ctr., 997 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1277 (M.D. Fla.
2014) (rejecting argument that Vermont Agency of Natural Resources does not permit relators to
seek civil penalties).
183. Clopton, supra note 25, at 438 (observing that “under current law, state courts may enter-
tain state and federal suits even if plaintiffs would lack Article III standing in federal court”).
184. Baumann v. Chase Inv. Servs. Corp., 747 F.3d 1117, 1122 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that
“PAGA actions are also not sufficiently similar to Rule 23 class actions to trigger CAFA
jurisdiction”).
185. Urbino v. Orkin Servs. of California, Inc., 726 F.3d 1118, 1123 (9th Cir. 2013).
186. Clopton, supra note 25, at 451, 459.
187. 871 F.3d 791 (9th Cir. 2017).
188. Id.
189. Id. at 798.
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Nonetheless, aggrieved party qui tam statutes like PAGA resemble
class claims to the extent that they aggregate penalties based on sub-
stantive law violations that affect groups of individuals.190 This is par-
ticularly the case for areas such as employment law, in which
individual and state interests heavily overlap. While some form of
state oversight over aggrieved party claims for aggregated penalties is
certainly a requirement for qui tam claims, Iskanian v. CLS Transpor-
tation Los Angeles and Sakkab v. Luxotica Retail North America de-
clined to undertake the project of explaining how to sufficiently
distinguish the aggregation of penalties from class claims. This is a
concern to which I will return. But states have broad authority to en-
force laws to vindicate their sovereign interests, including by limiting
the delegation of public enforcement to specific types of claimants.
And, so long as the claim belongs to the state, it is unclear how limit-
ing qui tam statutes to individuals harmed by the defendant’s conduct
runs afoul of the FAA’s intent to curtail judicial hostility toward indi-
vidual arbitration.
Skepticism about this form of state experimentation must consider
the Supreme Court’s recognition of federalism interests weighing
against FAA preemption of it. There is a presumption against preemp-
tion of state qui tam statutes that enforce state labor protections “un-
less that is Congress’ clear and manifest purpose . . . .”191 Consistent
with these federalism concerns, California and the Ninth Circuit have
upheld PAGA against FAA preemption challenges. In 2014, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court in Iskanian, found that the FAA does not re-
quire enforcement of a PAGA waiver.192 The Iskanian Court first
affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff’s class claims, finding that the
FAA required enforcement of a class waiver after Concepcio´n.193 Pre-
saging Epic Systems, it held that the NLRA does not protect class
claims from waiver under the FAA.194 But a PAGA claim is brought
on behalf of the state and asserts the state interest in addressing sys-
temic and documented under-enforcement of state labor protections,
particularly in the under-regulated sectors of the economy.195 PAGA
190. PAGA permits any aggrieved employee to aggregate penalties associated not only with
the violation of that aggrieved employee’s rights, but any aggrieved employee. Huff v. Securitas
Sec. Servs. USA, Inc., 23 Cal. App. 5th 745, 761 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018), reh’g denied (June 13,
2018), review denied (Aug. 8, 2018).
191. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996).
192. 59 Cal. 4th 348, 384 (Cal. 2014).
193. Id. at 360–61.
194. Id. at 372–73.
195. The distinct public interest advanced by a PAGA claim distinguishes it from a class claim.
The Supreme Court in Waffle House placed great weight on this distinction. This is different
from the issue in Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt., 505 U.S. 88 (1992), in which a state sought
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reflects a legislative choice to delegate public enforcement to private
enforcers because agency enforcement alone cannot deter “serious
and ongoing wage violations,”196 which harm vulnerable employees
and deprive the state of billions in tax revenue.197 The civil penalties
authorized under PAGA are, therefore, “distinct from the statutory
damages to which employees may be entitled in their individual ca-
pacities.”198 Relying on Waffle House, the Iskanian Court found that
the FAA does not limit qui tam claims, like PAGA, which do not dis-
place bilateral arbitration of private interests, but rather “enforce the
state’s interest in penalizing and deterring employers who violate Cali-
fornia’s labor laws.”199
The California Supreme Court’s holding that PAGA actions cannot
be privately waived became known as the Iskanian rule. A split soon
developed between state courts, which applied the Iskanian rule, and
some federal trial courts, which rejected it. In 2015, the Ninth Circuit,
in a two-to-one panel, resolved the dispute in Sakkab, affirming the
Iskanian rule that the FAA did not require California to enforce
PAGA waivers.200 It held that FAA preemption was not required be-
cause of the strong presumption against preemption and because
PAGA enforcement presents no obstacle to the FAA.201 The court
rejected concerns that PAGA claims are procedurally complex since,
unlike class action claims, the only due process requirements are those
of the defendant, relator, and state; and any factual complexities can
be addressed by limiting discovery.202 Agreeing with Iskanian that
PAGA is a qui tam action, the Ninth Circuit held that the FAA did not
intend to preempt qui tam statutes that enforce state employment
laws.203
Epic Systems suggests that the FAA preempts any vehicle that ag-
gregates claims unless conceptually distinct from the class claim that
the individual would assert but for a contractual waiver. PAGA juris-
prudence resolves this tension by requiring arbitration of “victim-spe-
to avoid Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) preemption by asserting a non-pre-
empted purpose. As the Supreme Court held in Gade, “[t]he key question is thus at what point
the state regulation sufficiently interferes with federal regulation that it should be deemed pre-
empted under the Act.” Id. Here, the question is whether the state retains an independent,
public interest in a PAGA claim. If it does, the claim does not implicate the FAA.
196. Iskanian, 59 Cal. 4th at 379.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 381.
199. Id. at 387 (emphasis in original).
200. Sakkab v. Luxottica Retail N. Am., Inc., 803 F.3d 425, 437 (9th Cir. 2015).
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 439–40.
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cific relief” while permitting PAGA enforcement of state penalties.204
As the Ninth Circuit reasoned in Sakkab, penalty aggregation does
not present the same FAA obstacle preemption argument as aggrega-
tion of individual damages would.205 A determination about state pen-
alties does not bind individuals regarding their individual substantive
rights. Claiming penalties under PAGA is substantially the same as a
whistleblower qui tam claim that calculates a penalty based on the
total monetary harm of the conduct, or for the number of fraudulent
certifications, and presents no obstacle to enforcing the FAA regard-
ing class waiver for individual claims. Aggregating state penalties for
multiple violations of the same statute is precisely the type of claim
that the public has an independent interest in enforcing. By itself,
then, aggregating penalties appears to be sufficiently distinct from a
class claim aggregating individual claims of substantive law violations
to survive Epic Systems.
In sum, the careful identification in Vermont Agency of Natural Re-
sources of “both a legal right to assert the claim and a stake in the
recovery,” in a qui tam claim,206 is sufficient to uphold whistleblower
qui tam statutes against constitutional and FAA preemption chal-
lenges. Epic Systems is unlikely to require FAA preemption of qui
tam statutes generally, and a formalist interpretation would not re-
quire FAA preemption of PAGA either.207 Like the FCA, PAGA is a
qui tam claim because it belongs to California, and the FAA is not
implicated because California is not a party to the contract. Requiring
waiver of state aggrieved party qui tam statutes, moreover, must also
overcome the strong federalism concerns that animate Sakkab. De-
spite the divided panel in Sakkab, it remains good law.208 Sakkab,
which took account of the Supreme Court’s current due process turn
to liberty of contract analysis in Italian Colors, is the only appellate
authority on FAA preemption of state aggrieved party qui tam claims.
No court has enforced a waiver of representative PAGA claims on
204. See Esparza v. KS Indus., L.P., 13 Cal. App. 5th 1228, 1243 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017), review
denied (Nov. 15, 2017) (finding that “victim-specific relief” is not subject to PAGA).
205. Sakkab, 803 F.3d at 435–36.
206. Sprint Commc’ns Co. v. APCC Servs., 128 S. Ct. 2531, 2550–57 (2008) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting) (joined by Justices Thomas and Alito) (emphasis in original).
207. It is unclear whether Epic Systems would require FAA preemption of aggrieved party qui
tam statutes like PAGA using a different interpretive approach.
208. Courts after Sakaab have limited the Iskanian rule to civil penalties recoverable by the
state and not individuals. Mandviwala v. Five Star Quality Car, Inc., 723 Fed. Appx. 415, 417–18
(9th Cir. 2018) (finding that plaintiff claims of unpaid wages must be arbitrated under FAA).
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FAA grounds,209 and the Supreme Court has subsequently declined
review of the issue.210
B. The Post-Epic Systems Doctrinal Threat to and Risk of Private
Enforcer Misuse of Qui Tam Enforcement
While Epic Systems is unlikely to require enforcement of waivers of
all qui tam claims, Sakkab did not address at what point aggrieved
party qui tam claims, without agency authority to intervene in the liti-
gation, are artfully styled class claims. Iskanian and Sakkab assumed
without discussion that a PAGA claimant is a “proxy or agent of the
state’s labor law enforcement agencies.”211 This description is belied
by the discretion that claimants have to bring and resolve PAGA
claims, and the Supreme Court’s description of qui tam claims in Ver-
mont Agency of Natural Resources as “effecting a partial assignment”
of a state’s claim.212 This distinction is an important one because the
relator in a qui tam claim has no standing to litigate a qui tam claim
unless the state maintains an interest in the suit. Loosening agency
oversight requirements to encourage private enforcer claims risks
challenge that these statutes are end runs around the FAA. A plausi-
ble extension of Epic Systems would hold qui tam claims that lack
significant state oversight waived as class actions in disguise.213
This has significant implications for states that seek to expand en-
forcement of employment laws through the qui tam vehicle. To avoid
FAA preemption, the states’ expansion of qui tam must ensure the
state has a distinct interest from the harmed individual in vindicating
public law. Vermont Agency of Natural Resources seemed to assume a
comparably distinct federal interest in DOJ’s oversight of FCA claims.
While the California Labor and Development Workforce Agency
(LWDA) has significant gatekeeping powers over PAGA, particularly
209. See Mandviwala, 723 Fed. Appx. at 417; Canela v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 13-CV-03598,
2018 WL 2331877, at *7 (finding that government agency “is always the real party in interest in
the [PAGA] suit”) (quoting Iskanian v. CLS Transp. Los Angeles, 59 Cal. 4th 348, 382 (Cal.
2014) (quotation marks omitted).
210. Prudential Overall Supply v. Betancourt, 138 S. Ct. 556, 556 (2017) (denying petition for
writ of certiorari seeking review of California decision upholding Iskanian rule).
211. Sakkab v. Luxottica Retail N. Am., Inc., 803 F.3d 425, 435 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Is-
kanian, 59 Cal. 4th at 380).
212. Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 773 (2000) (empha-
sis added) (internal quotations omitted).
213. Professor Gilles and Mr. Friedman argue that lack of agency control over PAGA claims,
along with “its relator-injury requirement [and] its compensation for similarly injured unnamed
parties . . . all but begs the current Supreme Court to look past the qui tam provisions as a sort of
sheep’s clothing and locate inside a class action wolf.” Gilles and Friedman, The New Qui Tam,
supra note 25, at 523.
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after the 2016 amendments, DOJ has greater oversight over the
FCA—especially the authority to move to settle or dismiss claims dur-
ing litigation. State experimentation that would remove all agency su-
pervision from qui tam claims may bring such claims outside of Waffle
House, requiring enforcement of qui tam waiver provisions.
The stakes of ensuring that qui tam statutes advance a public inter-
est extend beyond qui tam enforcement. This places pressure on the
holding in Waffle House that the EEOC has a distinct interest from
individuals because of its significant independent authority. The Su-
preme Court in Waffle House stressed the importance of the EEOC’s
ability to prosecute a claim without the private individual’s consent or
control over the claim. The EEOC’s unquestioned control over the
claim enables it, “as master of its own case . . . to evaluate the strength
of the public interest at stake.”214 Blurring the distinction between
public agency and individual interests may place Waffle House at risk.
If public agencies lack any control over a claim to protect a distinct
public interest apart from the private enforcers asserting the claim,
then the private parties whose rights public agencies vindicate may be
parties after all. And if these individuals are parties who are subject to
mandatory arbitration agreements, then all affirmative enforcement
of public laws that harm victims may require individual arbitration.
This outcome would fundamentally distort public agency enforcement
of employment laws by limiting victim-specific relief.
Setting aside the constitutional and FAA analysis, agency oversight
is necessary to avoid the risk of private, for-profit litigators abusing
public enforcement powers.215 While a modest expansion of qui tam
enforcement is unlikely to cause an explosion of frivolous lawsuits,216
the growth of PAGA filings in California suggests that state agencies
will only be able to intervene in a small proportion of them. This may
create incentives for private attorneys to file and resolve qui tam
214. E.E.O.C. v. Waffle House Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 291 (2002).
215. See Margaret H. Lemos, Privatizing Public Litigation, 104 GEO. L.J. 515, 537–56 (2016)
(The risk of private abuse of public enforcement is most salient for private firms hired by gov-
ernment to prosecute criminally or to engage in wide-ranging civil litigation with the vast re-
sources and sanctions of the state.).
216. As the California Supreme Court explained in Iskanian, the risk of meritless PAGA
claims is low compared to private attorneys hired by agencies as agents of the state because “The
qui tam litigant has only his or her own resources and may incur significant cost if unsuccessful.”
Iskanian v. CLS Transp. Los Angeles, 59 Cal. 4th 348, 391(Cal. 2014). Empirical analysis of FCA
claims by David Freeman Engstrom “points decisively away from widespread claims that qui tam
enforcement efforts are in the midst of an inefficient ‘explosion.’” David Freeman Engstrom,
Private Enforcement’s Pathways: Lessons from Qui Tam Litigation, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1913,
1963 (2014).
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claims in ways that are inconsistent with the agency’s enforcement pri-
orities and the interests of the affected employees.
Private enforcement can depart from the public interest in two dif-
ferent directions: (1) by diverting public enforcement tools to target
violations that cause little harm to employees, such as inadvertent,
harmless errors on paystubs or required postings, rather than to reveal
illegal conduct “that is prohibitively costly for public regulators to dis-
cover or dislodge[;]”217 and (2) by colluding with the regulated entities
to settle qui tam claims cheaply because of their binding effect on the
state and other affected employees. The former can be easily ad-
dressed legislatively by exempting technical violations from the scope
of qui tam statutes, as PAGA does and most states have proposed in
their qui tam bills.
But while qui tam statutes can effectively tamp down on over-en-
forcement, the binding nature of a qui tam claim makes under-en-
forcement a more pressing, and complex, concern. In particular,
private enforcers may file qui tam claims and resolve them cheaply in
a “reverse auction,” in which plaintiff’s attorneys settle qui tam claims
on substandard terms to avoid being outbid by more pliant plaintiff’s
attorneys. LWDA’s involvement in the unsuccessful resolution of the
PAGA claim in O’Connor and its later resolution by a different set of
attorneys illustrates the complexity of the problem. While LWDA
does not, under PAGA, have the right to intervene in the litigation of
PAGA claims after the initial period, courts often seek agency gui-
dance about whether PAGA settlement requests satisfy the state’s in-
terests. Like standard agency actions, LWDA evaluates these PAGA
settlements based on the strength of the claim and the extent to which
the settlement amount achieves its deterrence goal. The preclusive ef-
fect of a PAGA settlement, both on the state and other aggrieved par-
ties, has led the agency to object to low PAGA settlement amounts on
the ground that these factors suggest a reverse auction.218 LWDA
raised concerns about settlement proposals by both sets of private at-
torneys, which the O’Connor Court relied on in rejecting the propo-
217. Engstrom, supra note 216, at 1978 (providing as one example of private enforcers “ex-
ploit[ing] regulatory ambiguities,” FCA “boosting” claims that “targeted an ambiguity in federal
royalty regulations as to whether compression at the tailgate of the plant was within the confines
of the plant [and subject to royalty, or] . . . outside the plant, and thus exempt from royalty as
part of the ‘marketing’ process”).
218. See, e.g., Alonzo v. Clarke, LWDA Amicus Curiae Br., BC433932, at 15 (2nd App. Dist.
Cal. Mar. 14, 2018). LWDA has also objected to settlement requests that fail to calculate the
maximum value of released claims, making an objective assessment of the settlement impossible.
See Price v. Uber Technologies, Cal. Lab. Comm. Amicus Curiae Br., BC554512, at 5 (Sup. Ct.
L.A. Cty. June 16, 2017).
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sal, but which a later court, considering a similar PAGA claim by a
second set of attorneys, did not find persuasive.219
Prior to the decertification of the class claim by the Ninth Circuit,
the parties agreed in O’Connor to resolve all claims for up to $100
million, including $1 million to resolve a PAGA claim. The LWDA,
estimating that the PAGA penalties were worth $1 billion, could dis-
cern “no rationale” for settling the PAGA claim for such a low
amount.220 The court, agreeing with the agency, rejected the parties’
motion for preliminary approval of class settlement.221 Months later,
however, over LWDA’s objections on similar grounds, a different
state judge approved resolution of the same PAGA claim in Price v.
Uber. That PAGA settlement, negotiated by different attorneys, was
for a larger amount than in O’Connor, $7.75 million, but provided no
remedy for Uber’s failure to pay owed wages. A small fraction of the
total $1 billion value of the claim, the proposed settlement in Price
additionally purported to release any claim by “the State of California
. . . [of] all PAGA claims known or unknown related to the claims
being released.”222 According to the LWDA, the Price settlement
terms suggest a reverse auction. Its approval may have undermined
deterrence and deprived the state of a final judicial determination re-
garding the correct classification of the drivers.
The states that have proposed qui tam enforcement along the lines
of PAGA have addressed this concern by permitting the state to inter-
vene upon good cause shown, and, in some states, by permitting the
state agency to disqualify qui tam counsel who fail to adequately re-
present relators. This Article agrees with this approach, and argues
that PAGA should be amended along these lines to reduce incentives
for private enforcer misuse of qui tam enforcement. Permitting state
agency intervention even after an initial period will also be necessary
to prevent FAA preemption, by constraining qui tam enforcement in
ways that advance a distinct, public purpose.
The next Section will explore the primary alternative to state
agency supervision—judicial supervision via due process limitations to
qui tam enforcement. It concludes that extant due process protections
are imperfect guardrails because they only protect defendants and do
219. Price v. Uber Technologies, Order Granting Approval of PAGA Settlement and J.
Thereon, BC554512, at 1 (Sup. Ct. L.A. Cty. Jan. 13, 2018).
220. O’Connor v. Uber Technologies, Cal. LWDA Comments on Proposed PAGA Settlement,
13-CV-03826-EMC, at 3 (N.D. Cal. July 29, 2016).
221. O’Connor v. Uber Tech., 201 F. Supp. 3d 1110, 1135–36 (N.D. Cal. 2016).
222. Price v. Uber Technologies, Cal. Lab. Comm. Amicus Curiae Br., BC554512, at 6 (Sup.
Ct. L.A. Cty. June 16, 2017) (emphasis added).
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not adequately protect the interests of the states or affected
employees.
C. Due Process and Excessive Fines Are Insufficient Guardrails to
Constrain Qui Tam Enforcement
Courts constrain the states’ power to impose penalties under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Excessive
Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment which, after Timbs, extends to
the states. The Due Process Clause and Excessive Fines Clause are
overlapping due process protections for defendants against arbitrary
and unreasonable penalties. Qui tam civil sanctions and treble dam-
ages awards are at least partially punitive and therefore susceptible to
due process and excessive fines review.223 As the Court reasoned in
Vermont Agency of Natural Resources, qui tam claims are “essentially
punitive in nature,”224 even though they also serve a remedial
purpose.
Under familiar due process analysis, courts limit the imposition of
qui tam penalties based on the factors set forth by the Supreme Court
in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Campbell:225 “(1) the
degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s misconduct; (2) the dis-
parity between the actual or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff
and the punitive damages award; and (3) the difference between the
punitive damages awarded by the jury and the civil penalties author-
ized or imposed in comparable cases.”226 Similarly, a fine is unconsti-
tutionally excessive if the payment “is grossly disproportional to the
gravity of a defendant’s offense.”227 The appellate courts that have
considered the question find that an excessive fines analysis of qui tam
223. The Due Process Clause imposes substantive limits on punitive but not compensatory
damages. While civil sanctions are always punitive, the treble damages portion of a False Claims
Act claim is in part compensatory because it compensates the state for “the costs, delays, and
inconveniences occasioned by fraudulent claims,” Cook Cty., Ill. v. United States ex rel. Chan-
dler, 538 U.S. 119, 130 (2003), and it compensates relators with a portion of the award. See
United States v. Mackby (Mackby I), 261 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 2001). The Fourth, Eighth and
Ninth Circuits have held that qui tam penalties are fines subject to eighth amendment scrutiny
because they are primarily punitive and seek to deter. United States ex rel. Bunk v. Gosselin
World Wide Moving, N.V., 741 F.3d 390, 408 (4th Cir. 2013); Hays v. Hoffman, 325 F.3d 982, 992
(8th Cir. 2003); Mackby I, 261 F.3d at 831. Cf. United States v. Rogan, 517 F.3d 449, 454 (7th Cir.
2011) (declining to rule on whether FCA penalties are fines under the Eighth Amendment but
reasoning that excessive fines scrutiny of FCA penalties “would [not] differ dramatically” from
due process analysis); see also Bucy, Private Justice and the Constitution, supra note 24, at
967–69.
224. Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 784 (2000).
225. 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
226. Id. at 416.
227. United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 334 (1998).
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\69-2\DPL215.txt unknown Seq: 48 27-APR-20 17:54
404 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:357
penalties tracks the reprehensibility and disparity State Farm
factors.228
Courts rarely find that FCA penalties violate defendants’ due pro-
cess rights. This is not surprising, as the FCA treble damages award is
well within the State Farm “4[:]1 ratio”229 due process rule of thumb,
and courts defer to legislative guidance that a penalty is necessary to
deter a substantive law violation.230
States can increase due process protections for defendants by stat-
ute beyond this constitutional minimum. California incorporates a
version of these due process requirements in PAGA, by permitting
courts to lower civil penalty amounts if the award would be “unjust,
arbitrary and oppressive, or confiscatory,”231 an approach also taken
by other states in proposing their own version of qui tam statutes.232
California courts have relied on these limitations to reduce awards
because the employer’s obligations are unclear, that the employer
sought to comply after becoming aware of their obligations, or that
the employee suffered no injury as a result of the violation. In Fleming
v. Covidien, Inc.,233 for example, a trial court reduced a judgment of
PAGA penalties for inadequate wage statements from $2.8 million to
$500,000 because “the aggrieved employees suffered no injury due to
the erroneous wage statements,” and the defendants took active steps
228. There is a reasonable argument that Timbs stands for the proposition that heightened
Eighth Amendment scrutiny is in order where the enforcer has a personal interest in the prose-
cution. But the risk of abusive fines in qui tam enforcement is lower than the civil forfeiture fine
at issue in Timbs, because the penalties are set by the legislature and are directly related to
violations of public law. For this reason, courts generally find that the excessive fines analysis
merges with the State Farm due process factors. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Drakeford v.
Tuomey, 792 F.3d 364, 388–90 (4th Cir. 2015) (finding that excessive fines analysis of an FCA
penalty tracks the State Farm due process factors); United States v. Rogan, 517 F.3d 449, 454
(7th Cir. 2008) (reasoning that even if the Excessive Fines Clause imposed a greater restraint on
punitive damages than the Due Process Clause, that “a fine expressly authorized by statute could
be higher than a penalty selected ad hoc by a jury”).
229. State Farm, 499 U.S. at 23–24 (instructing that “an award of more than four times the
amount of compensatory damages might be close to the line of constitutional impropriety”).
230. See United States ex rel. Drakeford, 792 F.3d at 389 (finding that an FCA award did not
violate due process because Congress’s judgment about the illegal conduct, strong interests in
deterring fraud on the government, and prescription of FCA damages and penalties, and the
defendant’s knowing violations were evidence of the reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct,
and “the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages is approximately 3.6:1, which falls
just under the ratio the Court deems constitutionally suspect”).
231. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699(e)(2). See, e.g., York v. Starbucks Corp., No. CV 08-07919 GAF
PJWX, 2012 WL 10890355, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2012) (“[S]ection 2699(e)(2) provides the
Court with the ability to fashion an appropriate penalty in this case that will not offend notions
of due process.”).
232. See, e.g., S.P. 558, 129th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess., No. 1693 §§ 840(B)(1)(2)(e) (Me. 2019);
Assemb. B. A2265, 2019 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 10 (N.Y. 2019).
233. No. (OPX), 2011 WL 7563047 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2011).
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to comply in good faith.234 California also protects the due process
rights of defendants by precluding redundant PAGA judgments.
Hence, a PAGA judgment “is binding not only on the named em-
ployee plaintiff but also on government agencies and any aggrieved
employee not a party to the proceeding.”235
These due process protections seem adequate to deter private en-
forcers from abusing qui tam enforcement in ways that unreasonably
penalize defendants. They also preserve the distinction between pri-
vate and public interests in pursuing employment law penalties by del-
egating to the judiciary the authority to reduce qui tam penalties that
do not serve the public interest. But they reveal two important weak-
nesses to the current due process framework for qui tam enforcement.
First, there are information asymmetries that courts face in deter-
mining whether qui tam enforcement advances the public interest and
which courts can be ill-equipped to resolve. California’s “suitable seat-
ing” regulation illustrates the problem.236 The regulated community
has objected to the increasing use of PAGA to seek penalties for vio-
lations of a California regulation requiring employers to provide “suit-
able seating” for employees when reasonable.237 For decades, retailers
and banks ignored the regulation and required their cashiers and tell-
ers to stand during the work day, and LWDA has historically under-
enforced the regulation.238 Beginning shortly after the enactment of
PAGA, private enforcers began targeting large retailers for PAGA
suitable seating claims, with substantial settlements, including a $65
million settlement with Walmart.239 While increasing access to justice
for these affected employees, and deterring violation of the suitable
seating regulation, defendants protested that the private enforcers
were misusing public enforcement tools by targeting a regulation that
the public agency had not prioritized in its own investigations. In urg-
ing the dismissal of these actions, defendants argued that California’s
“inaction in enforcing the seating requirement reflect[ed] a tacit con-
clusion that seats are not required for bank tellers and retail cash-
iers[ ]” and effectively nullified the regulation.240
234. Id. at *4.
235. Arias v. Superior Court, 46 Cal. 4th 969, 985 (Cal. 2009).
236. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 8, § 11040.
237. Kilby v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., 63 Cal. 4th 1, 8 (Cal. 2016) (citing CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 8,
§§ 11040, subd. 14(A) (Wage Order No. 4–2001), 11070, subd. 14(A) (Wage Order No. 7–2001)).
238. See id. at 22–23 (acknowledging “the DLSE’s inaction in enforcing the seating
requirement”).
239. Braden Campbell, Walmart to Pay $65M to End Cashiers’ Seating Suit, LAW360 (Oct. 11,
2018).
240. Kilby, 63 Cal. 4th at 8.
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The California Supreme Court in Kilby v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc. cor-
rectly rejected defendants’ evidence of agency inaction as “inconclu-
sive”241 because agency inaction is as likely to evince lack of public
enforcement resources as a determination that the regulation has little
public value.242 Defendant’s argument in Kilby ignores the legislative
purpose of qui tam statutes to increase enforcement of labor provi-
sions not adequately enforced by the state agency. From the stand-
point of the legislature in enacting PAGA, the lack of public agency
enforcement of the suitable seating regulation makes qui tam enforce-
ment more, not less important. Kilby, nonetheless, shows the difficul-
ties courts face in evaluating defendant claims that a qui tam action
does not advance the public interest. Courts lack sufficient informa-
tion to discern the meaning of agency action or inaction. Agency inac-
tion could reflect (a) a reasoned determination that enforcement is
not in the public interest; (b) under-enforcement driven by a lack of
public resources; or (c) agency capture by the regulated entities. While
courts may seek to resolve this ambiguity by reference to the legisla-
tive history of the qui tam statute, legislative intent is itself often am-
biguous. PAGA suggests a legislative intent to deter “serious and
ongoing wage violations” and address systemic under-enforcement of
substantive law in the underground economy.243 But requiring private
enforcers to show that claims advance these interests may unduly con-
strain qui tam enforcement, compromising the California’s legislative
intent “to achieve maximum compliance with state labor laws . . . .”244
Agency guidance about the public value of “suitable seating” regula-
tions may also reveal an under-discussed public interest, such as pro-
tection against repetitive stress injuries, or as a reasonable
accommodation for people with disabilities and for pregnant employ-
ees in predominantly female occupations.245 Perhaps for these rea-
sons, in Kilby, the California Supreme Court wisely found that agency
inaction is an insufficient reason to constrain qui tam enforcement.
But, as in Kilby, legislative guidance that qui tam statutes seek to in-
crease the enforcement of under-enforced statutes has justifiably led
courts to defer to the private enforcer’s priorities over employer
claims of over-enforcement.
241. Id. at 23.
242. Id.
243. Sakkab v. Luxottica Retail N. Am., Inc., 803 F.3d 425, 430 (9th Cir. 2015).
244. Iskanian v. CLS Transp. Los Angeles, LLC., 59 Cal. 4th 348, 379 (Cal. 2014).
245. Women comprise 81.7% of bank tellers and 73% of cashiers. See Matt Rocheleau, Chart:
The Percentage of Women and Men in Each Profession, BOSTON GLOBE (2016).
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Second, while these due process protections can guide courts in
evaluating excessive and arbitrary qui tam claims, they impose a one-
way ratchet to lower penalties, not to raise inadequate penalties. They
also ignore the role of the agency as gatekeeper of qui tam claims and
leave unexamined a private enforcer’s inadequate representation of
affected employees. The binding nature of qui tam claims raises signif-
icant due process concerns, and the state and aggrieved parties lack
sufficient ability to object to the adequacy of the private enforcer’s qui
tam award.246 A LWDA review of proposed private PAGA settle-
ments, which found that most were insufficient, shows that this is a
serious concern.247 Particularly with the fall of the employment law
class action, judicial scrutiny of qui tam awards may provide an insuf-
ficient check on private enforcer misuse.
Thus, while current due process protections can guide private en-
forcers away from over-enforcement, they do not consider under-en-
forcement, or the interests of the states or the affected employees.
Constraining qui tam claims via agency oversight is necessary to pre-
serve the qui tam vehicle from FAA preemption and to reduce the
risk of private enforcer misuse. The next Part proposes agency super-
vision, already required in many states’ nondelegation doctrines and
contemplated by states considering qui tam expansion, to impose
agency oversight of qui tam enforcement beyond the initial stage of
the qui tam filing. It also explores measures to represent the interests
of affected employees outside class action procedure.
246. In arguing in favor of safeguards for affected employees in the resolution of qui tam
claims, I do not claim that preclusion of aggrieved parties seeking to file subsequent qui tam
claims violates due process. Normally successive litigation cannot be precluded unless adequate
safeguards protect the interests of absentees because the application of claim and issue preclu-
sion to nonparties must be consistent with due process. Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892–93
(2008). However, as the California Supreme Court in Arias reasons, a qui tam claim belongs to
the government, and preclusion of the government’s claim is necessary to safeguard defendants’
due process rights. Arias v. Superior Court, 46 Cal. 4th 969, 986 (Cal. 2009). In contrast, PAGA
permits aggrieved employees to pursue any remedy other than PAGA penalties, CAL. LAB.
CODE § 2699(g)(1), and aggrieved employees may invoke collateral estoppel to use a PAGA
judgment to obtain remedies for the underlying employment law violations, the same way collat-
eral estoppel may later apply to a government agency action seeking penalties. Arias, 46 Cal. 4th
at 986; Baumann v. Chase Inv. Servs. Corp., 747 F.3d 1117, 1123 (9th Cir. 2014).
247. The PAGA Unit of LWDA reviewed over 1,500 PAGA settlement agreements from 2016
through 2018 and found that seventy-five percent “received a grade of fail or marginal pass,
reflecting the failure of many private plaintiffs’ attorneys to fully protect the interests of the
aggrieved employees and the state.” DLSE BUDGET PROPOSAL 2019, supra note 151, at 6.
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IV. PUBLIC AGENCY SUPERVISION OF QUI TAM ENFORCEMENT TO
PREVENT FAA PREEMPTION AND REDUCE THE RISK
OF PRIVATE ENFORCER MISUSE
The previous Part has shown that insufficient agency safeguards
risks FAA preemption and can encourage private enforcer misuse,
which current due process limitations insufficiently address. This Part
first offers the guardrail of public agency oversight, often constitution-
alized in state nondelegation doctrine, to require private enforcers to
advance a distinct, public interest. While this constraint will improve
deterrence, it may not check the incentives of private enforcers—and
agencies—to advance and supervise qui tam enforcement in ways that
can harm the interests of affected employees. Because qui tam en-
forcement may not mimic class actions without risking FAA preemp-
tion, attending to the due process interests of affected employees will
require measures outside of class action procedure. This Part will pro-
pose that legislatures contemplating qui tam statutes track the states
that have contemplated their own versions of qui tam statutes by per-
mitting state agencies to intervene in a qui tam claim after the initial
period of intervention has expired if there is a good cause, such as
evidence of a reverse auction. State oversight over qui tam claim reso-
lution will also afford the state agency with the ability to provide af-
fected employees with a voice in resolving qui tam claims. It also
proposes that legislatures permit nonprofit public interest organiza-
tions to enforce employment law standards under qui tam statutes as
whistleblowers that are unlikely to abuse the delegation.
A. Attending to State Interests Through State Agency Oversight
The doctrinal threat of an insufficiently bounded qui tam statute,
and attendant risks of private enforcer misuse identified in the previ-
ous Part, demonstrate the need for constraints on qui tam statutes be-
yond employer-focused due process protections. States may structure
these constraints through agency oversight, either in legislation—as
states that have contemplated qui tam statutes have considered—or in
the nondelegation doctrine of many state constitutions.
State nondelegation doctrine attends to this principal-agent prob-
lem by requiring agency oversight. While federal nondelegation doc-
trine principally limits the delegation of power by the legislative
branch to the executive branch,248 state nondelegation doctrine also
constrains legislative grants to private entities, requiring sufficient
248. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns., 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (“In a delegation challenge,
the constitutional question is whether the statute has delegated legislative power to the
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safeguards on private delegations to prevent abuse.249 By distinguish-
ing the public and private interests in qui tam enforcement, the
nondelegation doctrine serves as a constitutional guardrail to preserve
the qui tam vehicle from FAA preemption and address the risk of
private enforcer misuse of qui tam enforcement. Tracking the FCA,
states with a strong nondelegation doctrine must permit the agency to
move to intervene in a private enforcer’s qui tam claim for good
cause.250 States with weaker nondelegation doctrines, like Califor-
nia,251 may require agency oversight whether or not required in their
constitution. All seven states that have considered qui tam bills track
these constraints, akin to the FCA, permitting agency intervention at
any time after the filing of a qui tam claim upon motion, for good
cause shown.252 Most of these bills additionally authorize the state
agency to disqualify qui tam counsel based on past misconduct.253
While not constitutionally required, to improve oversight over inade-
quate PAGA settlements, California could adopt the approach of
other states in amending PAGA to permit the LWDA to intervene in
or dismiss a PAGA claim after the initial period has elapsed upon a
showing of good cause.
agency.”). Federal courts have declined to strike down delegations to private entities since
Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936). See Metzger, supra note 156, at 1438–40.
249. See Nester M. Davidson, Localist Administrative Law, 126 YALE L.J. 564, 622–24 (2017);
Jim Rossi, Institutional Design and the Lingering Legacy of Antifederalist Separation of Powers
Ideals in the States, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1191–1201 (1999).
250. See, e.g., Int’l Game Tech., Inc. v. Second Judicial Dist. Court of Nevada, 122 Nev. 132,
149–50 (Nev. 2006).
251. While California has a weak nondelegation doctrine, see Julian v. Glenair, Inc., 17 Cal.
App. 5th 853, 866 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017), as modified on denial of reh’g (Dec. 13, 2017), review
denied (Feb. 14, 2018) (quoting Iskanian, 59 Cal. 4th 348, 391), PAGA permits the agency to
intervene in a qui tam claim during an initial period despite the fact that California’s nondelega-
tion doctrine does not require it.
252. See H.B. 5381, 2020 Gen. Assemb., Feb. Sess. § 1(s) (Conn. 2020) (permitting public
agency to intervene as of right within thirty days of filing of action, and afterward for good cause
shown); S.P. 558, 129th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess., No. 1693 §§ 7(A)(3)-(4) (Me. 2019) (permitting state
to dismiss or settle qui tam claim at any time upon notice and motion if “the court determines
that such dismissal or settlement is fair, adequate, reasonable and in the public interest,” and so
long as the resolution provides for “fair compensation for the attorney’s fees and costs”); S.B.
1066, 191st Gen. Assemb. § 364(i) (Mass. 2019) (permitting intervention at any time “for good
cause shown”); Assemb. B. A2265. 2019 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019) (same); S.B. 750,
80th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 5(7)(b) (Or. 2019) (same); S.B. 139, 2019 Leg. § 52(d)(1)(B) (Vt.
2019) (same); H.B. 1965, 66th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 6(1)(b) (Wash. 2019) (same).
253. Me. S.P. 558, No. 1693 § 6 (permitting state attorney general after notice and hearing to
disqualify qui tam counsel, based on past conduct showing that “the attorney does not meet the
required professional standards of representatives or fails to zealously pursue the remedies”
available in qui tam statute); Mass. S.B. 1066 § 355 (same); Or. S.B. 750 § 5(6) (same); Wash.
H.B. 1965 § 5(4) (same).
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Public agency supervision, whether through state nondelegation
doctrine or by statute, clarifies the agency’s distinct interest in advanc-
ing the public interest. The states’ ongoing qui tam intervention rights,
per Waffle House, “confers on the agency the authority to evaluate the
strength of the public interest at stake.”254 Such supervision addresses
the Epic Systems concern that qui tam claims are end runs around the
FAA by preserving the state’s role as the party at interest in the claim.
It also reduces the risk of court error in determining whether qui tam
claims advance the public interest, by referring the question to the
public agency. Taking the above example of Price, the court’s ap-
proval of the Price settlement, notwithstanding LWDA’s objections,
appears to have contravened the intent of the qui tam statute and the
agency’s public enforcement priorities. Particularly in instances in
which qui tam claimants act purely as representatives of the state (as
opposed to the joined qui tam and class claims in O’Connor), the
agency seems well positioned to determine whether the proposed res-
olution of the qui tam claim sufficiently advances state interests.255
Taking the state’s interest seriously would permit the agency to move
to intervene to resolve the claim itself or to dismiss the claim for good
cause shown. Once the agency has chosen not to intervene, the court
may more confidently conclude that the qui tam enforcement ad-
vances a distinct, public interest.
Providing for sufficient agency oversight over private enforcers to
intervene in the resolution of qui tam claims that do not advance the
public interest can improve deterrence and protect qui tam enforce-
ment from FAA preemption. State agency supervision alone, how-
ever, will not ensure that private enforcers adequately represent the
interests of the affected employees. The next Section takes up the in-
terests of affected employees and proposes measures to encourage af-
fected employees to participate in the resolution of qui tam claims.
B. Attending to Affected Worker Interests Through Agency-
Administered or Delegated Qui Tam Claim Resolutions
Up until now, this Article has assumed that the greatest risk to qui
tam enforcement is its loose oversight by state agencies. Doctrinally,
this is because agency oversight can guard qui tam enforcement from
254. E.E.O.C. v. Waffle House Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 291 (2002).
255. Legislatures, of course, may also have greater expertise than courts in identifying the
public interest in qui tam enforcement, and may structure incentives in qui tam statutes to en-
courage private enforcers to enforce in specific industries or involving specific types of practices
or employees. The legislature may also require agency intervention under specific circumstances,
as I propose infra, Part IV.B.1.
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FAA preemption. Making private enforcers accountable to public
agencies that are charged with representing the public interest can
also be an attractive model to deter unfaithful agents who would
abuse qui tam enforcement in ways that harm the public interest.
But constraining qui tam enforcement with agency oversight can
create incentives for public agency abuse and can be in tension with
the goal of improving access to justice. Aggrieved parties, and private
enforcers, may be less willing to assert qui tam claims if agency over-
sight is more likely or onerous. And whether placing the private en-
forcer under firmer agency control makes private enforcers more
accountable to the interests of the affected employees is contestable.
Class action scholars, raising similar concerns, consider forms of
participation to improve the accountability of class counsel to class
members.256 But class action procedure for participation by affected
employees in class claims are unavailable in state qui tam litigation.
Qui tam statutes offer no participation to the affected class in litiga-
tion, as the claim belongs to the state and not the aggrieved parties.
Exit rights are meaningless for qui tam claims, as most aggrieved em-
ployees are not parties to the claims. Nor could states improve af-
fected employee participation by grafting class action procedure into
qui tam statutes without courting FAA preemption, as this would fur-
ther muddle the distinction between state and individual interests in a
qui tam claim. Joinder of qui tam and class claims permits courts to
consider the interests of the affected class in their resolution. But with
the fall of the employment law class action after Epic Systems, class
action procedure to encourage participation by the affected class will
be beyond the reach of state qui tam statutes.
This Section argues that accounting for the interests of the affected
employees could be accomplished through an agency-led process for
affected employees to object to a claim resolution plan. This can also
be accomplished by the legislative assignment of qui tam enforcement
to nonprofit public interest organizations less likely to misuse qui tam
enforcement than for-profit enforcers.
1. Agency-Administered Resolution of Qui Tam Claims
Agencies, upon identifying the inadequate representation of af-
fected employees by private qui tam enforcers, may intervene in these
claims to resolve them internally and seek both penalties and restitu-
256. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and
Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370, 438 (2000); Samuel Issacharoff,
Class Action Conflicts, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 805, 833 (1997).
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tion for victims as they would in any public enforcement action. As
Michael Sant’Ambrogio and Adam Zimmerman demonstrated in a
series of articles, government agencies often mimic class action proce-
dures to adjudicate and resolve aggregate claims.257 Waffle House per-
mits agencies to seek a wide range of victim-specific class relief
despite mandatory arbitration.258 Public agencies, which can control
the process and outcome of enforcement actions outside of a court
proceeding, may be able to resolve qui tam claims more efficiently
than private enforcers in court. After Epic Systems, public agencies
can almost certainly resolve related employment law claims more effi-
ciently as well, by virtue of their ability to aggregate claims notwith-
standing mandatory arbitration with class waivers. Granting agencies
the right to intervene in qui tam enforcement can not only protect the
states’ interests, but can also advance affected employees’ interests in
restitution for related employment law violations.
But as Professor Zimmerman argues in the context of class actions,
the same principal-agent problem of misaligned interests that can af-
fect private qui tam enforcers can also affect agencies. Many agencies
lack basic due process protections afforded by the judiciary to en-
courage class member participation in class action settlements.259 This
is particularly problematic to the extent that, as with PAGA, employ-
ees have no legally cognizable interest in penalties, yet are bound to
qui tam judgments. In these circumstances, aggrieved employees lack
standing to object to the sufficiency of the bounty even though the
bounty may be the only realistic award that many aggrieved employ-
ees may receive after a harm caused by an employment law viola-
tion.260 Lacking these protections, agencies may resolve qui tam
257. Adam S. Zimmerman, Distributing Justice, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 500, 518 (2011) [hereinaf-
ter Zimmerman, Distributing Justice]; Michael Sant’Ambrogio and Adam Zimmerman uncover
a pattern of federal agencies, including the EEOC, adopting internal procedures that mimic class
action procedures. Michael D. Sant’Ambrogio & Adam S. Zimmerman, Inside the Agency Class
Action, 126 YALE L.J. 1634, 1667–68 (2017); see also Michael D. Sant’Ambrogio & Adam S.
Zimmerman, The Agency Class Action, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1992, 1999 (2012).
258. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 297–98.
259. Zimmerman, Distributing Justice, supra note 257, at 540, 546–47 (Agencies do not re-
quire, as class action settlements do, that “all class members receive individualized notice, offer
opportunities to members to intervene or object, and divide members with different interests
into subclasses that are each entities to separate representation in settlement negotiation.”); see
also Margaret H. Lemos, Aggregate Litigation Goes Public: Representative Suits by State Attor-
neys General, 126 HARV. L. REV. 486, 531–42 (2012).
260. A bounty amount that is far lower than the harm caused by the aggrieved employees’
attendant employment law claim is not be objectionable doctrinally or from a deterrence per-
spective, but is problematic from an access to justice standpoint, insofar as a qui tam bounty is
the only realistic award available to a low-wage worker who has been harmed by an employment
law violation.
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claims without ensuring that the penalties sought are adequately
keyed to the harm the violations caused aggrieved employees. As
Margaret Lemos argues, addressing this due process concern will re-
quire safeguards to protect the interests of affected employees.261 And
yet, requiring public agencies to expend enforcement resources on qui
tam safeguards seems at odds with the very purpose of qui tam en-
forcement, which is intended to supplement public agency enforce-
ment resources.
To be sure, all class action settlement procedures are not necessary,
and at times may not be desirable, to adequately represent the af-
fected employees’ interests.262 Criticisms that the class action vehicle
creates “monopoly power . . . over the representation of class mem-
bers”263—requiring checks on the exercise of this power—do not ap-
ply here. Individually affected employees are not due the process
afforded to them in class action proceedings, since qui tam claims do
not resolve their individual rights. Affected employees retain their
employment law rights, which they may assert in litigation or an arbi-
tral forum. As argued in the previous Part, state agencies (prodded by
the legislature) can be well-positioned to determine the public interest
served in qui tam enforcement. If agencies abuse qui tam enforce-
ment, they may be held publicly accountable in ways that class action
attorneys cannot. Settlement of a qui tam claim may, additionally,
pose fewer conflicts among affected employees, as penalties are easier
to ascertain and distribute than individualized damages assessments.
Nonetheless, the state interest in qui tam claims and the political
legitimacy of public enforcement do not diminish the importance of
qui tam claims (and restitution for attendant employment law viola-
tions) to affected employees. This is especially true post-Epic Systems,
after which many individual employment law claims cannot be effec-
tively vindicated. States contemplating qui tam statutes should con-
sider administrative procedures to encourage private enforcers of qui
tam claims to represent aggrieved employees for their attendant em-
ployment law violations in individual arbitrations.264 They should also
permit aggrieved parties to object to proposed settlements of qui tam
261. Lemos, supra note 259, at 542–48.
262. Opt-out rights, for example, are of little value for a qui tam claim in which the aggrieved
parties are bound to any judgment.
263. Richard A. Nagareda, The Preexistence Principle and the Structure of the Class Action,
103 COLUM. L. REV. 149, 168 (2003).
264. Professor Zimmerman additionally proposes the appointment of a mediator to identify
affected parties, which “could then develop a settlement distribution plan under a negotiated
rulemaking process, subject to agency oversight” and judicial review. Zimmerman, Distributing
Justice, supra note 257, at 564.
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claims.265 State agencies may encourage these practices by declining to
intervene in the resolution of qui tam claims in which the private en-
forcer follows them, and legislatures may require agencies to follow
them internally when they do intervene.
2. Assignment of Qui Tam Enforcement to Nonprofit Organizations
While agency-led and -encouraged qui tam claim resolution can ad-
vance the interests of both the state and aggrieved employees in effec-
tive enforcement of employment law, this assumes that public
agencies can correct incentives by private enforcers to misuse qui tam
enforcement. This may be true in some circumstances, as the previous
Part raised in its discussion of reverse auctions. But, applied more
broadly, this is a contestable proposition.266 In addition to lacking ac-
countability, state agencies may—or must, if we are to take due pro-
cess seriously—consider the interests not only of victims, but also the
defendants.267 Lacking formal procedural safeguards in agency claim
resolution, state agency accountability to affected employees is atten-
uated by electoral politics, in which the priorities of state agencies
may shift dramatically from one term to the next.268 Increased agency
oversight may also increase the risk of agency abuse of the private
delegation, particularly in state government. As Miriam Seifter cau-
tions, state government can be anti-majoritarian in a way that opens
state agencies to regulatory capture.269 Captured agencies with broad
intervention rights may intervene in qui tam actions in order to volun-
tarily discontinue meritorious claims.270 These agency incentives sug-
265. Id.
266. The federal DOL recently signaled its intention not to enforce wage-and-hour law in
workplaces subject to MAAs. Zachary Clopton & David Noll, Trump Labor Officials Are
Secretly Using Forced Arbitration to Get Corporations Off the Hook, SLATE (May 10, 2019).
267. Margaret Lemos, Three Models of Adjudicative Representation, 1743 U. PENN. L. REV.
1743, 1754 (2017) [hereinafter Lemos, Three Models of Adjudicative Representation] (“[T]he re-
lationship between representative and represented is far more attenuated in the context of gov-
ernment litigation than it is in the individual model.”); see also Margaret H. Lemos, Aggregate
Litigation Goes Public: Representative Suits by State Attorneys General, 126 HARV. L. REV. 486
(2012).
268. Agencies may change their previous positions, and switch sides in multi-term enforce-
ment actions. Lemos, Three Models of Adjudicative Representation, supra note 267, at 1756–57.
269. According to Professor Seifter: “the confluence of limited openness, a limited and im-
balanced monitoring community, and limited media attention . . . often redounds to the benefit
of concentrated interests.” Miriam Seifter, Further from the People? The Puzzle of State Admin-
istration, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 107, 112 (2018).
270. This is the concern raised by DOJ’s recent requirement that agency staff searchingly
review relator claims and dismiss those that lack merit: that DOJ is seeking to reduce public
enforcement with little public oversight rather than to weed out meritless claims. U.S. DEPT. OF
JUSTICE, MICHAEL GRANSTON, FACTORS FOR EVALUATING DISMISSAL PURSUANT TO 31 U.S.C.
§ 3730(C)(2)(A) (Jan. 10, 2018), https://www.fcadefenselawblog.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/
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gest, as David Freeman Engstrom argues, that qui tam statutes, by
removing some agency control from public enforcement, “can im-
prove, rather than degrade, democratic politics by offering a salutary
counterweight to ‘capture’ and other patterns of political control
within the legislative or administrative process.”271
This analysis suggests that while for-profit, private enforcers may
have a profit motive to misuse qui tam enforcement, state agencies
can also distort qui tam enforcement in ways that under-deter and
harm affected employees. For this reason, a strong nondelegation doc-
trine that would permit the agency to intervene and dismiss qui tam
claims for any reason272 may harm access to justice, while requiring
the agency to show good cause in order to intervene may strike a bet-
ter balance. Whatever the optimal level of agency oversight over qui
tam enforcement to protect the states’ interests, states, in choosing the
intervention rights of the agency, should consider their likely impact
on deterrence and the interests of affected employees.
To the extent that the profit motive can distort public enforcement
priorities, channeling qui tam enforcement to private enforcers that
lack a profit motive may improve access to justice273 without threaten-
ing the states’ interests. Qui tam statutes may reduce the risk of pri-
vate enforcer misuse, as most states considering qui tam statutes have
contemplated, by assigning qui tam enforcement to nonprofit public
interest organizations as representative organizations.274 The District
561/2018/01/Memo-for-Evaluating-Dismissal-Pursuant-to-31-U-S.pdf. The bills proposed by
Massachusetts, Oregon and Washington address this incentive for public agency abuse by condi-
tioning private enforcer disqualification on a court’s determination of misconduct. See S.B. 1066,
191st Gen. Assemb. § 355 (Mass. 2019); S.B. 750, 80th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 5(6) (Or.
2019); H.B. 1965, 66th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 5(4) (Wash. 2019).
271. Engstrom, supra note 216, at 2003–04.
272. The nondelegation doctrine of Florida, for example, requires that the state attorney gen-
eral retain the power to dismiss a relator’s qui tam action for any reason, even if the state de-
clined to previously intervene. Barati v. State, 198 So.3d 69, 82–83 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016),
review denied, No. SC16-834, 2016 WL 4429843 (Fla. Aug. 22, 2016), and cert. denied sub nom.
Barati v. Fla., 137 S. Ct. 1085 (2017), reh’g denied, 137 S. Ct. 1618 (2017) (rejecting argument that
state must first show good cause before intervening to dismiss an FCA claim).
273. Because restricting qui tam enforcement to nonprofit corporations would reduce access
to justice by constraining it to the limited capacity of nonprofit corporations, nonprofit corpora-
tion qui tam enforcement supplements, and does not replace, public and for-profit enforcement.
274. See Mass. S.B. 1066 § 227(4) (defining as a representative organization “an organization
that is tax-exempt . . . and that regularly advocates on behalf of employees or that regularly
assists” in the enforcement of state employment law, and that has been designated by the ag-
grieved person); S.P. 558, 129th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess., No. 1693 § 840-A(4) (Me. 2019) (defining as
a representative organization “a nonprofit corporation or union that regularly assists in enforce-
ment [of state employment law] . . . and has been selected by an aggrieved person” to initiate a
qui tam claim on her behalf); Assemb. B. A2265, 2019 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019)
(same); Or. S.B. 750 § 1(4) (same); S.B. 139, 2019 Leg. § 51(7) (Vt. 2019) (same). Washington
does not restrict representative organizations to non-profit organizations, but the term does in-
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of Columbia enacted a version of this in permitting public interest or-
ganizations to sue on behalf of consumers to enforce consumer pro-
tection laws.275 Additionally, similar enforcement delegations have
been enacted internationally.276 Following these examples, California
should consider amending PAGA to provide for representative organ-
ization standing to assert qui tam claims as well.
Restricting qui tam claims to nonprofit corporations with a charita-
ble purpose of advancing the interests of affected employees supple-
ments agency oversight with nonprofit board governance. This is
likely to improve access to justice, as nonprofits have an obligation to
ensure that their activities do not violate their charitable mission. As-
signing qui tam enforcement to nonprofits may also improve affected
employee participation in the litigation. As Professor Lemos argues,
these groups can improve the democratic accountability of enforce-
ment by virtue of their accountability to the collective interests of the
affected community.277 This is particularly the case for unions and
worker-led organizations, which have a reputational interest in the
participation of their members in qui tam enforcement as aggrieved
employees.278 Permitting employees to remain confidential by
designating representative organizations as relators also advances de-
terrence and access to justice by reducing the threat of retaliation.
Of course, claims about the motivations and democratic accounta-
bility of nonprofit corporations are also contestable. For-profit firms
may seek to bypass these limitations by conducting qui tam litigation
through non-profit organizations, and bona fide nonprofit corpora-
tions may be no more open to aggrieved employee participation than
clude “labor organization[s],” and requires the organization to “be one that regularly assists in
enforcement” of state employment law. See Wash. H.B. 1965 §3(9).
275. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3905 (West 2019); see Nat’l Consumers League v. Bimbo Bak-
eries USA, 46 F. Supp. 3d 64 (D.D.C. 2014) (The District of Columbia permits “a public interest
organization” to sue “on behalf of the interests of a consumer or a class of consumers,” against
“any person of a trade practice in violation of” consumer protection laws.).
276. See Zachary D. Clopton, Transnational Class Actions in the Shadow of Preclusion: Ap-
pendix Only (May 22, 2015), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2609339 (listing Belgium and the
Netherlands).
277. Lemos, Three Models of Adjudicative Representation, supra note 267, at 1761–64. Profes-
sor Lemos, while acknowledging that most nonprofit public interest organizations are not au-
thorized by and accountable to the affected community, nonetheless notes that “nonprofits are
accountable—to those who support and validate them.” Id. at 1761.
278. I have previously made this argument in the context of non-profit, public-interest organi-
zations that collaborate with state agencies in assisting low-wage workers with employment law
claims. See Elmore, supra note 35, at 122–29.
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for-profit corporations.279 Resource-starved nonprofit corporations
may be unable to allocate sufficient resources to resolve claims effec-
tively. Vesting private enforcement in nonprofits that rely on attor-
ney’s fees for funding may make those entities more beholden to, and
less likely to be effective watchdogs of public agencies. For these rea-
sons, this Article agrees with the approach of most state bills: contem-
plating nonprofit organizations as relators of managing these risks by
limiting representative organizations to those that regularly enforce
state employment law, and by delegating the decision to disqualify
representative organizations to courts and not the state agency. While
these measures cannot contain all possible risks of nonprofit misuse,
these risks are far outweighed by the risks of agency capture by em-
ployers and under-enforcement caused by the decline of aggregate liti-
gation by employees after Epic Systems.
In short, while qui tam statues cannot substitute for the participa-
tion that class members can have in a class action, the qui tam vehicle
can be an effective substitute of class action claims to deter violations
of employment law. It can also substantially improve access to justice
for vulnerable employees who would not otherwise seek to vindicate a
meritorious claim.
CONCLUSION
After Epic Systems, most workplaces require employees to waive
participation in class claims. This undermines deterrence and access to
justice, particularly for low-value and difficult-to-prove employment
law claims. The state response of qui tam statutes that partially dele-
gate the public interest in penalties to private enforcers can improve
deterrence of and access to justice for these claims. But Epic Systems
raises the possibility that courts will view state qui tam claims with
loose agency oversight as a class action in disguise, requiring their pre-
emption under the FAA. Privatizing public enforcement may also cre-
ate incentives for private enforcers to misuse the delegation and does
not adequately protect the interests of the states or affected employ-
ees. This Article argues that state agency oversight can protect state
qui tam claims from FAA preemption, reduce the risk of private en-
forcer abuse, and permit public agencies to provide aggrieved parties
to participate in the resolution of qui tam claims. Legislatures may
further account for affected employee interests by requiring agency
279. See Miriam Seifter, Second-Order Participation in Administrative Law, 63 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 1300, 1338–49 (2016) (examining limitations on voice and exit rights in non-profit organiza-
tions that commonly interact with public agencies, which do not ensure public participation).
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supervision of the resolution of qui tam claims and assigning them to
nonprofit corporations, which are less likely to abuse the delegation.
